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Notes and Comments
Wrongful Pregnancy: Child Rearing
Damages Deserve Full Judicial
Consideration
I. Introduction
Over the last twenty years, parents wishing to avoid giving
birth to children for any number of reasons, have made increas-
ing use of the technique of voluntary sterilization.1 With the de-
cline in the popularity of "the pill,"2 voluntary sterilization has
become the most widely used method of contraception in the
United States.3 This is even more common among couples who
have completed their families and are permanently opting for no
more children.4
Along with the increasing use of sterilization has come a
new cause of action which has become known as wrongful preg-
nancy or wrongful conception.5 Typically, the wrongful preg-
1. N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 1984, at 29, col. 1-6.
2. Id. at col. 5. "Birth control pills were used by 23.9 percent of married couples in
1965, 36.1 percent in 1973 and 19.8 percent in 1982, the report showed." Id.
3. Id. at col. 1-2. Based on interviews with 7,969 women in 1982, the National
Center for Health Statistics found, "18 percent of couples with partners 15 to 44 years
old avoided pregnancy through sterilization of either partner, while 16 percent chose
birth control pills. Condoms were used by 7 percent, diaphragms by 5 percent and in-
trauterine devices by 4 percent." Id.
4. Id. at col. 4. See also Comment, By What Measure?: The Issue of Damages for
Wrongful Pregnancy, 16 N.C. CENT. L.J. 59, 59 (1986).
5. Cheslik, Wrongful Conception, 35 FED'N INS. COUNS. Q. 289, 289 (Spring 1985):
American courts have long recognized a legal cause of action when negligence
causes death. It seemed contrary to law and public policy, however, to recognize a
cause of action when negligence causes pregnancy and life. Nevertheless, American
society has changed from an agricultural to an urban society and a rural to an
urban lifestyle. Family planning and population control have been emphasized,
and women have had an increased role working in jobs other than those associated
with the home. With these changes in attitude, the addition of an unplanned and
unwanted child has come to be viewed by many as an injury for which compensa-
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nancy cause of action arises when a husband and wife request
that a sterilization procedure, a tubal ligation in the female or a
vasectomy in the male,6 be performed so that no future children
will be born to the couple; the procedure is performed, and the
wife later becomes pregnant.7 A healthy child is born, and the
couple then sues the physician,8 the hospital,9 or both.10
In deciding such cases, the court must first decide whether
or not the law of the state recognizes the wrongful pregnancy
cause of action.11 If so, the plaintiffs must prove that the neces-
sary elements of the tort of negligence are present including a
tion ought to be available. Courts have accommodated this "modern" attitude by
using tort law to provide a cause of action. Persons who sought to avoid concep-
tion have been allowed to bring actions against negligent doctors or providers of
medical services whose misfeasance resulted in pregnancy and birth of unwanted,
unplanned children.
Id.
6. Strausberg, The Failed Tubal Ligation, 21 TRIAL 30 (May 1985). Sterilization in
the female is accomplished by a procedure known as a tubal ligation. There are a number
of techniques used to accomplish this procedure, the ultimate goal of which is to block
the Fallopian tubes and prevent the sperm from uniting with the egg. Such a procedure
may fail as a result of physician negligence by the physician missing a tube, cauterizing
or ringing the wrong structure, or by inadequate burning or banding of the tube.
[O]n the average, there is a 'natural' failure rate of four to eight per thousand for
all techniques. The reason is either a process called recanalization or one called
fistule formation. In both, a channel forms in the gap or defect created in the tube
that allows sperm and egg to unite.
Id.
See also Lombardi, Vasectomy, 10 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 25, 32 (1975), in which the
author describes the male sterilization procedure. Since some sperm can remain stored in
the seminal vesicle and prostate for several weeks following a vasectomy, a negative se-
men analysis must be accomplished before the patient may be declared surgically sterile.
Id. at 33. Spontaneous recanalization, where the vas rejoin, occurs in .5 to 1.0% of the
cases. Id. at 33 n.60. Since this has been determined to be as likely a possibility as physi-
cian negligence, it has been suggested that res ipsa loquitur should not apply to these
procedures. Id. at 44 n.132.
7. See, e.g., Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So. 2d 718 (Ala. 1982) (request for tubal liga-
tion); University of Arizona Health Sciences Center v. Superior Court, 136 Ariz. 579, 667
P.2d 1294 (1983) (request for vasectomy).
8. See, e.g., Wilber v. Kerr, 275 Ark. 239, 628 S.W.2d 568 (1982).
9. See, e.g., Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth. v. Graves, 252 Ga. 441, 314 S.E.2d 653
(1984).
10. See, e.g., Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d 8 (Del. 1975).
11. Compare Byrd v. Wesley Medical Center, 237 Kan. 215, 225, 699 P.2d 459, 468
(1985) ("As a matter of public policy, the birth of a normal and healthy child does not
constitute a legal harm for which damages are recoverable.") with Macomber v. Dillman,
505 A.2d 810, 813 (Me. 1986) ("[I]t is clear that the necessary elements of a cause of
action in negligence have been set forth against the defendants.").
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duty owed, breach of that duty, proximate cause, and damages.' 2
This Comment concerns itself with the element of damages
and, specifically, with the damages related to the costs to the
parents of raising a healthy child born as a result of facts similar
to those outlined above. Part II of this Comment explores the
development of the wrongful pregnancy cause of action. Part III
considers the majority and minority views regarding the cause of
action and the issue of child rearing damages. Part IV discusses
the public policy rationale which underlies the majority view
and suggests an alternative approach. Finally, Part V concludes
that child rearing damages should be approved by all jurisdic-
tions because logic and adherence to fundamental tort principles
are preferable to vague reference to public policy. An Appendix,
following Part V, details the leading cases from each state on
these issues as of this writing.
II. Background
A. Development of the Cause of Action for Wrongful
Pregnancy
The new cause of action for wrongful pregnancy, which is
based upon medical malpractice, traces its roots to a 1934 case
decided by the Minnesota Supreme Court. In Christensen v.
Thornby," the plaintiff's wife had been advised by the defend-
ant physician that it would be dangerous to her health for her to
bear children. Consequently, the defendant performed a vasec-
tomy on the plaintiff, and sometime thereafter, the plaintiff and
his wife, relying on the defendant's advice, resumed sexual rela-
tions. The plaintiff's wife then became pregnant. The plaintiff
did not allege negligence in this early case, but he relied solely
on the defendant's failure to fulfill his promise regarding the
outcome of the operation. 4
The court decided that the operation was not illegal or
12. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 30, at 164-65 (1984). See also
Strausberg, supra note 6, at 32 (author explains that plaintiffs must prove the non-dam-
age elements through often complex showings requiring expert witnesses). The explana-
tion of sterilization procedures will not be discussed in this Comment.
13. 192 Minn. 123, 255 N.W. 620 (1934).
14. Id. at 124, 255 N.W. at 621.
1988]
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against public policy.1 5 However, the court sustained the defend-
ant's demurrer because the plaintiff's complaint was based upon
deceit. Such an action requires the plaintiff to prove not only
that there was a false representation, but also fraudulent intent
on the defendant's part - and this the plaintiff was unable to
prove."6 Since the plaintiff did not allege negligence, his action
failed."1
The court noted that the purpose of the sterilization proce-
dure was to prevent injury to the mother and not to prevent the
expense of childbirth: "The wife has survived. Instead of losing
his wife, the plaintiff has been blessed with the fatherhood of
another child." 18 Thus, this early decision was based partly upon
a theory that would have profound impact on courts deciding
this issue in the 1970's and 1980's: that a child is a blessing and
not a detriment to its parents. The Christensen court completed
its opinion by stating, "[a]s well might the plaintiff charge the
defendant with the cost of nurture and education of the child
during its minority."1 9 These words were especially prophetic
because this issue has become the one with which courts have
had the most difficulty in the modern cases.
After Christensen, several other cases arose with similar is-
sues. In West v. Underwood,20 Mrs. West gave birth by Caesa-
rian section to a child and, as a result of this operation, suffered
an abdominal rupture and a toxic condition. When she again be-
came pregnant four years later, she consulted the defendant
physician who decided that she should have a second Caesarian
section followed by a tubal ligation. The physician delivered the
child but neglected to perform the tubal ligation. The plaintiff
was subjected to another operation because of complications
which the plaintiff attributed to the defendant's negligence. The
plaintiffs, Mr. and Mrs. West, urged that the defendant's failure
to sterilize the plaintiff in the second Caesarian section was the
proximate cause of the need for the third operation. The New
Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals held that such negligence, if
15. Id. at 125, 255 N.W. at 621.
16. Id. at 126, 255 N.W. at 622.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. 132 N.J.L. 325, 40 A.2d 610 (1945).
[Vol. 8:313
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found by the jury, would entitle the plaintiffs "to recover for all
pain and suffering, mental and physical, together with loss of
services and any other loss or damage proximately resulting
from such negligence."2
The first case to base the damages on family planning
rather than physical injury to the mother was Shaheen v.
Knight.22 Plaintiff, the husband, contracted with the defendant
physician for a vasectomy but the procedure failed, and the
plaintiff's wife gave birth to their fifth child. The plaintiff did
not allege negligence but, like the plaintiff in Christensen, sued
the defendant on the basis of breach of contract. The case, de-
cided in 1957, turned on the court's opinion that the plaintiff
had suffered no damages. The court said:
The only damages asked are the expenses of rearing and educat-
ing the unwanted child. We are of the opinion that to allow dam-
ages for the normal birth of a normal child is foreign to the uni-
versal public sentiment of the people.
... To allow damages in a suit such as this would mean that
the physician would have to pay for the fun, joy and affection
which plaintiff Shaheen will have in the rearing and educating of
this, [plaintiff's] fifth child. Many people would be willing to sup-
port this child were they given the right of custody and adoption,
but according to plaintiff's statement, plaintiff does not want
such. He wants to have the child and wants the doctor to support
it. In our opinion to allow such damages would be against public
policy.23
Thus, from a county court in Pennsylvania came the genesis of
another theory with which modern courts have strug-
gled - whether it was reasonable to hold that plaintiffs in cer-
tain circumstances may have mitigated their damages by adop-
tion or abortion.
In Ball v. Mudge,24 Mrs. Ball had previously given birth to
three children, all by Caesarian section. The defendant physi-
cian had counselled this couple that a fourth such procedure
21. Id. at 326, 40 A.2d at 611.
22. 11 Pa. D. & C. 2d 41 (C.P., Lycoming County 1957).
23. Id. at 45-46.
24. 64 Wash. 2d 247, 391 P.2d 201 (1964).
1988]
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would be inadvisable. In addition, the couple did not want the
expense of a fourth child. The case, therefore, involved both the
health of the mother and the family planning aspect.
The physician performed a vasectomy on the plaintiff which
failed, and a fourth child was delivered by Caesarian section.
Fortunately, there were no adverse complications for the
mother. The plaintiffs' suit was based both on contract and neg-
ligence, with the plaintiffs contending that the lack of post-ster-
ilization testing of the husband had led to the fourth pregnancy.
The defendant cited both Christensen and Shaheen and asked
the court to rule for him "because the birth of a normal child
without extraordinary pain, suffering or abnormal discomfort to
the mother during pregnancy, delivery and recuperation, cannot
be damage compensable in law."25
The court declined to so rule, but sustained the verdict for
the defendant physician for several reasons. First, the court
found that it was questionable whether post-operative testing
was the recognized standard of practice in the medical commu-
nity.26 Second, the plaintiffs had not established that negligence
or breach of contract had been the proximate cause of the preg-
nancy because recanalization could have occurred.27 Third, the
jury could have reasonably concluded that there were no dam-
ages in the birth of a normal child, whom the plaintiffs refused
to put up for adoption, because the benefits or blessings of hav-
ing such a child would far outweigh the cost of such a birth.28
Finally, in 1967, the cause of action came of age. In Cus-
todio v. Bauer,29 Mr. and Mrs. Custodio sued the defendant
25. Id. at 248-49, 391 P.2d at 203.
26. Id. at 249, 391 P.2d at 203.
The contention that the standard of practice in Seattle made post-operative test-
ing mandatory was in dispute. Respondent testified, "[slome doctors do and some
don't." Dr. Jack N. Nelson, a genitourinary surgeon with extensive experience in
the performance of vasectomies, testified that he knew of no standard of practice
in the community in that regard. The absence of an accepted standard of practice
is due partially to the fact that the operation is usually performed in the physi-
cian's office rather than a hospital.
Id.
27. Id. at 249, 391 P.2d at 203-04. For a discussion of "recanalization," see supra
note 6.
28. Id. at 250, 391 P.2d at 204. There were several other factors in the court's deci-
sion but they are not applicable to this discussion.
29. 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967).
[Vol. 8:313
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physicians for damages when a negligently performed steriliza-
tion procedure on Mrs. Custodio resulted in the birth of the
couple's tenth child." The court, after a lengthy discussion of
the earlier cases,31 allowed damages for the costs of the unsuc-
cessful operation,"2 physical complications,33 mental, physical,
and nervous pain and suffering, 4 measurable economic changes
in the status of other family members,35 and child rearing costs
offset by any benefit received by the parents "to the interest to
be protected."3 6
With remarkable forethought, the Custodio court became
not only the first court to truly recognize the cause of action for
wrongful pregnancy, but also applied one of the most liberal def-
initions of damages."7 Unfortunately, as Parts III and IV of this
Comment will show, this definition has become the minority
view of the American courts which have grappled with this
question.
B. The Law of Torts as Applied to Wrongful Pregnancy
Wrongful pregnancy or wrongful conception has been de-
fined as "an action brought by the parents of a healthy, but un-
planned, child against a physician who negligently performed a
sterilization or abortion. 3 8 Once the plaintiffs have proved this
negligence on the part of the physician, the court must decide
what types of damages will be allowed. Such damages ought to
be determined by the recognized standards of tort law.
30. Id. at 312 n.6, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 469 n.6.
31. Id. at 318-22, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 473-75.
32. Id. at 322, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 475.
33. Id. at 323, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 476.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 323-24, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 476.
36. Id. at 324, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 476. See also infra notes 185-195 and accompanying
text.
37. See Comment, supra note 4, at 65.
38. Nanke v. Napier, 346 N.W.2d 520, 521 (Iowa 1984) (citing Phillips v. United
States, 508 F. Supp. 544, 545 n.1 (D.S.C. 1981); University of Arizona Health Sciences
Center v. Superior Court, 136 Ariz. 579, 581, 667 P.2d 1294, 1296 n.1 (1983); Harbeson v.
Parke-Davis, Inc., 98 Wash. 2d 460, 465, 656 P.2d 483, 487 (1983)). Wrongful pregnancy
or wrongful conception should not be confused with two similar but different causes of
action: "'wrongful birth' [is] a claim brought by parents of a child born with birth de-
fects; and ... 'wrongful life' [is] a claim brought by the child suffering from such birth
defects." Nanke, 346 N.W.2d at 521.
1988]
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Section 901(a) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts pro-
vides that the purpose of damages in tort is "to give compensa-
tion, indemnity or restitution for harms."3" This involves placing
the injured party as nearly as possible in the position he occu-
pied prior to the tort.'0 When physical or mental harm is proved,
money damages are given as compensation." Other damages,
such as lost earnings, are compensated through the principle of
indemnity by approximating "the pecuniary harm the injured
person has suffered or is likely to suffer in the future."'"
A second purpose of tort damages is the deterrence of
wrongful conduct.'3 This purpose has distinct relationships to
criminal law and was formulated to prevent injured parties from
taking the law into their own hands via self-help." Punitive
damages, designed to serve this purpose, encourage the use of
the court system, thereby promoting a more orderly society.
The Restatement also provides that, in the overwhelming
majority of instances, an injured party should be able to recover
damages for all" the harm legally caused' 6 by the tortious con-
duct. Therefore, if negligence has been proved by the plaintiff,
one would expect redress for any consequences of the defend-
ant's actions which the court has found harmful to the plaintiff.
In applying these standard damage rules to the fact pat-
terns before them, the courts from Custodio to the present have
allowed the plaintiffs to recover any or all of the following:
1) hospital and medical expenses incurred for the steriliza-
tion procedure;' 7
2) cost of a properly performed (redone) sterilization
procedure; 8
3) hospital and medical expenses incurred for the unwanted
39. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901(a) (1977).
40. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 comment a (1977).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901(c) (1977).
44. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 comment c (1977).
45. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Introductory Note to Title B of Chapter 16
(1965).
46. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 917 (1977).
47. Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 322, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 475 (1967).
48. Flowers v. District of Columbia, 478 A.2d 1073, 1074 (D.C. 1984).
[Vol. 8:313
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pregnancy and birth;49
4) pain and suffering connected with the pregnancy and
birth;50
5) loss of earnings by the mother during pregnancy;5 1
6) loss of consortium;5'2
7) mental anguish and emotional distress;53 and/or
8) cost of rearing and educating the child.5 4
C. Three Views Toward Child Rearing Damages
Damages for child rearing costs have occupied much of the
courts' attention recently. The courts have taken three views to-
ward this category of damages.
"The first view is that the parents may recover only those
damages which occur as a result of pregnancy and birth, and may
not recover the costs of rearing the child.
"A second view allows the parents to recover all damages and
expenses mentioned above, but also includes the costs of [rearing]
a child. This is often called the 'full damage rule'....
"A third view, sometimes called the ordinary 'tort-benefit
rule' allows the recovery of all damages covered in the above two
views, but requires a deduction for the benefits that the parents
will receive by virtue of having a normal, healthy child.""5
This third view has been the source of some controversy.6
It is based upon section 920 of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts,51 which contemplates that damages to a particular inter-
est of the plaintiff will only be reduced to the extent that the
same interest of the plaintiff has been benefited by the defend-
49. Fassoulas v. Ramey, 450 So. 2d 822, 823 (Fla. 1984).
50. Hartke v. McKelway, 526 F. Supp. 97, 104 (D.C. 1981).
51. Kingsbury v. Smith, 122 N.H. 237, 243, 442 A.2d 1003, 1006 (1982).
52. Macomber v. Dillman, 505 A.2d 810, 813 (Me. 1986).
53. Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So. 2d 718, 723 (Ala. 1982).
54. Ochs v. Borrelli, 187 Conn. 253, 258, 445 A.2d 883, 885 (1982).
55. Byrd v. Wesley Medical Center, 237 Kan. 215, 216, 699 P.2d 459, 461 (1985)
(quoting the trial judge) (citations omitted).
56. See, e.g., Comment, One More Mouth to Feed: A Look at Physicians' Liability
for the Negligent Performance of Sterilization Operations, 25 ARIz. L. REV. 1069, 1074-
76 (Fall 1983); Comment, Judicial Limitations on Damages Recoverable for the Wrong-
ful Birth of a Healthy Infant, 68 VA. L. REV. 1311, 1323-26 (1982).
57. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 (1977).
19881
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ant's tort.8 Some judges have argued that the comments follow-
ing section 920 illustrate that the emotional interest which has
been benefited (the joys of raising the child) should be consid-
ered as separate from the financial interest which has been dam-
aged (the expense of raising the child) and that the benefit
should not offset and lessen the damages for which the defend-
ant is liable in this instance. 9 This was the position adopted in
Custodio, the original wrongful pregnancy case. e0
Other courts argue for a broader interpretation of the "in-
terest"61 where the financial burdens and the emotional benefits
are merely parts of one larger "family interest"6 and require
that all the circumstances, such as family size, income, and age
of the parents, be considered in order to determine whether the
child is a benefit to its parents." Still other courts have simply
decided to ignore the Restatement's "same interest" limitation
and weigh the pecuniary damages against the noneconomic
58. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 comment b (1977). "Damages resulting
from an invasion of one interest are not diminished by showing that another interest has
been benefited." Id.
59. See, e.g., University of Arizona Health Sciences Center v. Superior Court, 136
Ariz. 579, 589, 667 P.2d 1294, 1304 (1983) (Gordon, Vice Chief Justice, concurring in part
and dissenting in part):
A proper application of the "same interest" requirement in a wrongful pregnancy
case would require that pecuniary harm of raising the child be offset only by cor-
responding pecuniary benefit, and emotional benefits of the parent-child relation-
ship be applied as an offset only to corresponding emotional harm.
Id. (citations omitted).
60. 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 323, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 476 (1967):
[Tihe examples given in the Restatement contemplate a benefit to the interest to
be protected. If the failure of the sterilization operation and the ensuing preg-
nancy benefited the wife's emotional and nervous makeup, and any infirmities in
her kidney and bladder organs, the defendants should be able to offset it.
Id.
61. See Comment, supra note 56, at 1075 (citing several cases including Ochs v.
Borrelli, 187 Conn. 253, 445 A.2d 883 (1982) and Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260
N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977)).
62. See, e.g., Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 256-57, 187 N.W.2d 511, 518-19
(1971).
63. Id. at 257, 187 N.W.2d at 519.
The essential point, of course, is that the trier must have the power to evalu-
ate the benefit according to all the circumstances of the case presented .... That
the benefits so conferred and calculated will vary widely from case to case is
inevitable.
[Vol. 8:313
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benefits."
In any event, most of the courts which have considered this
issue have subscribed to the first view and have simply refused
to consider awarding child rearing damages at all." The follow-
ing reasons have been given for this refusal:
1) a child is a blessing, not a detriment, and parents are not
damaged by the birth of a healthy child;6
2) the child will be harmed emotionally when he finds out
that he was not wanted and was reared with another's funds;67
3) the state should not meddle with the integrity of the
family unit;6 8
4) child rearing damages are too speculative and uncertain,
necessitating prophecy and difficult burdens of proof; 9
5) such a damage award will be unfair to the physician and
out of proportion to his negligent act;"0
6) child rearing damages will promote fraudulent claims;7 1
7) the cause of action relates only to the pregnancy;72
8) the issue is one for the legislatures, not the courts, to de-
cide;"' and
9) the reluctance of courts to apply principles of mitigation
of damages which would require abortion or adoption. 4
Courts adhering to this majority position rely heavily on
public policy.7 5 Trends on this issue are discussed in the next
section, while the specific policy arguments listed above will be
addressed in Part IV.
64. See, e.g., Ochs v. Borrelli, 187 Conn. 253, 260, 445 A.2d 883, 886 (1982): "we
recognize that this balancing test requires the jury to mitigate economic damages by
weighing them against noneconomic factors .... Id.
65. See Comment, Wrongful Life and Wrongful Pregnancy, 9 J. Juv. L. 159, 161-62
(Wtr. 1985).
66. Fassoulas v. Ramey, 450 So. 2d 822, 823 (Fla. 1984).
67. Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So. 2d 718, 722 (Ala. 1982).
68. Wilber v. Kerr, 275 Ark. 239, 243, 628 S.W.2d 568, 571 (1982).
69. Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d 8, 12 (Del. 1975).
70. Beardsley v. Wierdsma, 650 P.2d 288, 292 (Wyo. 1982).
71. Id.
72. Coleman v. Garrison, 327 A.2d 757, 761 (Del. Super. 1974).
73. Schork v. Huber, 648 S.W.2d 861, 863 (Ky. 1983).
74. Kingsbury v. Smith, 122 N.H. 237, 243, 442 A.2d 1003, 1006 (1982).
75. See infra notes 220, 239, 251, 257, 263, 272, 275, 287, 300, 335, 339, 343, 363, 386,
and accompanying text.
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III. Trends
As of this writing, thirty-three states and the District of Co-
lumbia have ruled on this issue. One state76 has held that no
damages are recoverable. Twenty-six jurisdictions"7 have allowed
most normal tort damages, but have disallowed child rearing
costs. Six jurisdictions 7 have allowed child rearing damages with
an offset for the benefits gained from parenthood. One state 7
has allowed child rearing damages with no offset.
Clearly, therefore, the majority trend in the United States
has been to allow most normal tort damages to be recovered,
with the exception of child rearing costs. Furthermore, of the
eleven jurisdictions 0 to rule on this matter as an issue of first
impression since 1984, only one has failed to follow the majority
trend. The one exception, Nevada, has ruled that no damages
are recoverable.81
From a purely statistical viewpoint, therefore, the hopes of a
76. Nevada, see infra notes 328-331 and accompanying text.
77. Alabama, see infra notes 204-208 and accompanying text; Arkansas, see infra
notes 217-221 and accompanying text; Delaware, see infra notes 235-239 and accompany-
ing text; District of Columbia, see infra notes 240-247 and accompanying text; Florida,
see infra notes 248-252 and accompanying text; Georgia, see infra notes 253-259 and
accompanying text; Illinois, see infra notes 260-267 and accompanying text; Indiana, see
infra notes 268-272 and accompanying text; Iowa, see infra notes 273-276 and accompa-
nying text; Kansas, see infra notes 277-281 and accompanying text; Kentucky, see infra
notes 282-291 and accompanying text; Louisiana, see infra notes 292-297 and accompa-
nying text; Maine, see infra notes 298-303 and accompanying text; Missouri, see infra
notes 322-327 and accompanying text; New Hampshire, see infra notes 332-335 and ac-
companying text; New Jersey, see infra notes 336-339 and accompanying text; New
York, see infra notes 340-343 and accompanying text; North Carolina, see infra notes
344-350 and accompanying text; Oklahoma, see infra notes 355-359 and accompanying
text; Pennsylvania, see infra notes 360-369 and accompanying text; Tennessee, see infra
notes 370-372 and accompanying text; Texas, see infra notes 373-376 and accompanying
text; Virginia, see infra notes 377-382 and accompanying text; Washington, see infra
notes 383-386 and accompanying text; West Virginia, see infra notes 387-390 and accom-
panying text; and Wyoming, see infra notes 392-398 and accompanying text.
78. Arizona, see infra notes 209-216 and accompanying text; California, see infra
notes 222-228 and accompanying text; Connecticut, see infra notes 229-234 and accom-
panying text; Maryland, see infra notes 303-307 and accompanying text; Michigan, see
infra notes 308-314 and accompanying text; and Minnesota, see infra notes 315-321 and
accompanying text.
79. Ohio, see infra notes 351-354 and accompanying text.
80. Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Ten-
nessee, Virginia, and West Virginia, see supra note 77, and Nevada, see supra note 76.
81. See supra note 76.
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plaintiff to collect child rearing damages in a wrongful preg-
nancy/conception action would appear to be slim at best. It
should be noted, however, that strong concurring and dissenting
opinions advocating the allowance of these damages were filed in
fourteen, or fifty-four percent, of the majority rule juris-
dictions.8 2
Justice Faulkner of the Supreme Court of Alabama, concur-
ring specially in Boone v. Mullendore,"a disagreed with the ma-
jority's arguments for limiting damages. The majority argued
that public policy demanded that the value of human life pre-
cluded a damage award for child rearing expenses.8 4 Justice
Faulkner called this argument a "smokescreen hiding the true
issue" of whether a physician should be liable for the results of
his negligence. 85 The purpose of the wrongful pregnancy cause of
action should not be viewed as a recovery for the child's life, but
rather as a recovery for the economic loss that the extra child
translates into with regard to the rest of the family unit. 6 Such
an award will permit the parents to concentrate on their love for
this new addition. Denial of these damages cuts against the
constitutional right of parents to determine the size of their
families.88
Therefore, Justice Faulkner stated that he would allow child
rearing damages to be assessed, with an offset for the benefits
which accrue to the parents.80 Such damages are not too specula-
tive, and the Alabama courts have always permitted damages
which are not precisely measurable to be within the jury's
82. Alabama, Arkansas, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Ken-
tucky, Louisiana, Maine, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and Wyoming, see
supra note 77.
83. 416 So. 2d 718, 724-27 (Ala. 1982) (Faulkner, J., concurring).
84. Boone, 416 So. 2d at 722.
85. Id. at 724 (Faulkner, J., concurring).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 725.
88. Id. Here, Justice Faulkner cited Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bol-
ton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965):
[T]he Supreme Court of the United States recognized that the right to privacy
protects a husband and wife from unwarranted intrusions into the fundamental
decisions of a family concerning contraception and abortion.
Id.
89. Id. at 725-26.
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discretion."
A very similar opinion was written in dissent by Justice
Dudley of the Supreme Court of Arkansas, joined by Chief Jus-
tice Adkisson. In Wilbur v. Kerr,91 this dissent pointed out that
a well-tested principle of tort law had gradually evolved which
states that a tortfeasor should be held liable for all the damages
caused by his negligence.92 Justice Dudley complained that the
majority opinion ignored this time-tested principle in favor of an
undefined public policy. Understanding neither its origin, nor its
application,"3 he preferred to allow instead, the full range of
damages - including child rearing - with an offset for "the
value of the child's aid, comfort and society."'9
Judge Ferren, writing in dissent for the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals in Flowers v. District of Columbia," argued in
a particularly well reasoned and acerbic opinion that the award
of child rearing damages should depend on why the couple
sought the sterilization procedure in the first place."6 In Flowers,
the couple opted for sterilization because they could not afford
the financial burden of a fourth child.' In such a situation, the
damages of a negligently performed sterilization should be al-
lowed because the family stability would be undermined by the
birth. In contrast, where the sterilization is seen as necessary to
prevent a genetic abnormality in the child or a medical danger
to the mother, Judge Ferren would not allow damages for the
normal, uneventful birth of a healthy child because the feared
circumstances did not occur.' 8 He would allow an offset for the
benefit of parenthood, but would not allow emotional benefits to
be offset against financial injury. 9
The dissent in Cockrum v. Baumgartner,100 written by Jus-
90. Id. at 726-27.
91. 275 Ark. 239, 628 S.W.2d 568 (1982).
92. Id. at 244, 628 S.W.2d at 571 (Dudley, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 245, 628 S.W.2d at 572.
94. Id. at 246, 628 S.W.2d at 572-73.
95. 478 A.2d 1073, 1078-83 (D.C. 1984) (Ferren, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 1079 n.3.
97. Id. at 1079.
98. Id. at 1079 n.3.
99. Id. at 1080-81.
100. 95 Ill. 2d 193, 205-11, 447 N.E.2d 385, 391-94 (Clark & Simon, JJ., dissenting),
cert. denied, Raja v. Michael Reese Hosp., 464 U.S. 846 (1983).
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tice Clark, and joined by Justice Simon, of the Supreme Court of
Illinois, pointed out a very basic inconsistency in the reasoning
of the majority opinion. The majority began with the assump-
tion that there can be no injury in the birth of a normal, healthy
child. This formed the basis for a denial of child rearing dam-
ages. As the dissent explained, this decision was inconsistent be-
cause other damages were allowed, such as pain of childbirth,
time lost due to childbirth, and medical expenses. 101 If the birth
is not an injury, the dissent asked, then why should the parents
be compensated for the associated "pain"? 02 The obvious con-
tradiction continued, wrote Justice Clark, as the majority al-
lowed the medical expenses and espoused a public policy in "the
preservation and development of family relations. 10 3 Thus, only
the "first installment in an investment in the preservation and
development of family relations1 01 4 would be allowed by the ma-
jority, whereas the dissenters would allow the other installments
as well - child rearing damages offset by any benefits which
accrue to the parents from the birth. 0 5
This same criticism was articulated by Justice Scolnik, con-
curring in part and dissenting in part in Macomber v. Dill-
man, 10 a case decided by the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.
He argued with particularly strong logic that it is inconsistent to
award the parent damages for the loss of wages due to the in-
ability to work during the pregnancy, while denying the same
damages after the birth of the child. 0 7 He also complained, like
Justice Dudley of Arkansas' 0 8 in Wilber v. Kerr, that the major-
ity relied on public policy to reach its result, but never explained
"the source from which it was derived or the foundation on
which it rest[ed]."' 0 9
101. Id. at 205, 447 N.E.2d at 391.
102. Id. at 205, 447 N.E.2d at 392.
103. Id. at 205-06, 447 N.E.2d at 392.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 208-09, 447 N.E.2d at 393-94.
106. 505 A.2d 810, 813-18 (Me. 1986) (Scolnik, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
107. Id. at 814.
108. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
109. Macomber, 505 A.2d at 814-15 (Scolnik, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
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Justice Wolle, dissenting in Nanke v. Napier," ' complained
that the majority opinion which declared, as a matter of law,
that the benefits of parenthood will always outweigh the "mere
monetary burdens," '' ignored the basic premise that assessing
damages is one of the jury's traditional roles." 2 In other words,
he considered such a calculation to be a question of fact, not
law, and disagreed with the majority's decision which denied the
plaintiff the opportunity to prove facts concerning "her own
unique socio-economic circumstances and the reasons why she
wished to delay her raising of a child."'" 3
Schork v. Huber,"4 from the Supreme Court of Kentucky,
produced two dissents. The first, by Justice Leibson, argued that
the majority was making public policy, not following public pol-
icy."' He stated that "[p]ublic policy should not extend to mak-
ing a judgment, as a matter of law, that persons have suffered no
damages from the foreseeable consequences of a medical proce-
dure... ." 6 Justice Leibson would allow child rearing damages,
but would only allow emotional damages in regard to the actual
child bearing, which has the physical injury and pain aspects re-
quired for an emotional distress award." 7 In the second dis-
sent,"8 Justice Vance agreed with Justice Liebson in all but the
last point. Instead, he would have allowed additional emotional
distress damages related to the child rearing because they flow
directly from the physical contact present in the operation.""
Two dissents were also present in Mason v. Western Penn-
sylvania Hospital,20 decided by the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania. Chief Justice O'Brien, joined by Justice Flaherty, noted
that the Pennsylvania courts would award child rearing damages
to the parents of a child who is born with genetic defects, and he
110. 346 N.W.2d 520, 523-24 (Iowa 1984) (Wolle, J., dissenting).
111. Id. at 523.
112. Id. at 524 (citing Pagitt v. City of Keokuk, 206 N.W.2d 700, 703-04 (Iowa
1973)).
113. Id. at 524.
114. 648 S.W.2d 861 (Ky. 1983).
115. Id. at 864 (Leibson, J., dissenting).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 866.
118. Id. at 867-68 (Vance, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 867.
120. 499 Pa. 484, 453 A.2d 974 (1982).
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believed that they should also be awarded to the parents of a
normal child. 21 He further noted that the controlling issue giv-
ing rise to foreseeable damages was the physician's negligence,
not the child's medical condition: 12 2 "'The law of liability should
not turn on ... fortuitous considerations.' ",123 In a second dis-
sent, Justice Larsen amplified the previous dissent's view on
child rearing damages by reasoning that the emotional benefits
of rearing a child should only be offset against the emotional
trauma of child rearing and not against the actual financial costs
of child rearing. 124 In Justice Larsen's opinion, any other compu-
tation would produce a windfall for the tortfeasor.125
Finally, Chief Justice Rose of the Supreme Court of Wyo-
ming concurred specially in Beardsley v. Wierdsma.2 1 He dis-
agreed with the majority's contention that Wyoming had a pub-
lic policy preventing child rearing damages and noted that the
state program providing assistance for family planning evi-
denced exactly the opposite public policy. 2 7 He, therefore, pre-
ferred to allow child rearing damages with an appropriate offset
for the benefits associated with the addition of the particular
child to the family. Such benefits, he stated, would vary "de-
pending upon the circumstances of the parents." '128
All of these dissenting and concurring opinions were written
since 1982, and practitioners representing plaintiffs in those
states would probably be wise to check the current composition
of the courts involved before despairing on this issue: the dis-
senters could now be in the majority.'29
121. Id. at 488, 453 A.2d at 977 (O'Brien, C.J. & Flaherty, J., dissenting).
122. Id.
123. Id. (quoting Howard v. Lecher, 42 N.Y.2d 109, 113, 397 N.Y.S.2d 363, 365, 366
N.E.2d 64, 66 (1977)).
124. Id. at 496 n.1, 453 A.2d at 981 n.1 (Larsen, J., dissenting).
125. Id.
126. 650 P.2d 288, 293-97 (Wyo. 1982) (Rose, C.J., concurring).
127. Id. at 296.
128. Id.
129. As an example, Judge Kern, who wrote the majority opinion denying child rear-
ing damages in Flowers v. District of Columbia, 478 A.2d 1073 (D.C. 1984), has since
retired. Id. at 1074.
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IV. Child Rearing Damages
A. The Public Policy Debate
Most of the jurisdictions disallowing child rearing damages
employ a rationale based upon public policy.3 ° Occasionally, a
court will simply cite public policy considerations with little or
no justification. 31 One court stated, somewhat obliquely, that
public policy encourages "the development and the preservation
of family relations," and to permit damages with the accompa-
nying "transfer" of the costs of child rearing to a tortfeasor
would somehow negate that goal."' Most of the courts include
one or more of the following arguments either to explain or to
buttress their public policy stance. 133
1. The Birth of a Healthy Child Is Not an Injury
A frequently used argument is that the parents have not
been damaged by the birth of a normal child.13 4 And yet, invari-
ably, the same courts will allow other damages flowing from the
same negligent act to be recovered. 35 This apparently illogical
position was most obviously stated in Macomber v. Dillman,'36
where the Supreme Court of Maine held:
[A] parent cannot be said to have been damaged or injured by the
birth and rearing of a healthy, normal child. Accordingly, we limit
the recovery of damages, where applicable, to the hospital and
medical expenses incurred for the sterilization procedures and
pregnancy, the pain and suffering connected with the pregnancy
and the loss of earnings by the mother during that time.1 37
Even a justice who voted to deny damages for this tort has
recognized the illogical nature of this position.'38 Another court
130. See infra notes 220, 239, 251, 257, 263, 272, 275, 287, 300, 335, 339, 343, 363,
386, and accompanying text.
131. See, e.g., Schork v. Huber, 648 S.W.2d 861, 863 (Ky. 1983).
132. Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 95 Ii. 2d 193, 201, 447 N.E.2d 385, 390 (1983).
133. Counter arguments favoring child rearing damages are also presented. See, e.g.,
infra notes 145, 161, 183, and accompanying text.
134. See, e.g., Fassoulas v. Ramey, 450 So. 2d 822, 823 (Fla. 1984) (citation omitted).
135. Id.
136. 585 A.2d 810 (Me. 1986).
137. Id. at 813.
138. See infra note 382.
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explicitly admitted that child rearing damages were the result of
the tort, but disallowed them anyway.13 9
2. The Benefits of the Birth Always Outweigh the Damages
Closely allied with the argument that there are no damages
from the birth of a healthy child, is the argument that the bene-
fits always outweigh the costs of child rearing. 40 This argument
implies that child rearing damages are recoverable when offset
by the benefits of parenthood, but there is no reason to put such
a question to the jury because there cannot possibly be a recov-
ery. This thinking exhibits an apparent distrust, or perhaps fear,
of our jury system. First of all, even opponents of child rearing
damages have admitted that the benefits do not always outweigh
the costs."4 Secondly, the better rule would be simply to let the
jury, properly instructed in the applicable tort principles, make
the decision as with any other tort action. 42
3. The Child Will Become an Emotional Bastard
Some courts argue that the child will be harmed emotion-
ally when he eventually discovers that he was unwanted and was
reared with another's funds. 43 Most of these courts, however,
would allow some damages to be recovered, and it is difficult to
fathom how such a recovery will make the child feel less like an
emotional bastard than if full damages were allowed."" Many
children, born before the general societal acceptance of family
planning, were totally or vaguely aware that they were mistakes.
Has that had such a terribly deleterious effect on their psyches?
139. Kingsbury v. Smith, 122 N.H. 237, 244, 442 A.2d 1003, 1006 (1982): "The ele-
ments of damages that may be recovered are those that are a direct and probable result
of the defendant's negligence, except that recovery for the costs of raising a child are not
permitted." Id.
140. See, e.g., infra note 363.
141. See, e.g., McKernan v. Aasheim, 102 Wash. 2d 411, 418, 687 P.2d 850, 854
(1984) ("If such were the case, presumably no sterilization operations would be
performed.").
142. Nanke v. Napier, 346 N.W.2d 520, 524 (Iowa 1984) (Wolle, J., dissenting).
"[T]raditional principles of tort law are adequate to the task of instructing a jury on how
to reach a fair verdict on the damage issue here presented ... Id.
143. See, e.g., infra note 220.
144. Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So. 2d 718, 724-25 (Ala. 1982) (Faulkner, J., concur-
ring specially).
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Full damages would relieve some of the pressure on the family
unit caused by such births and contribute to family love rather
than deter it. 14 5
The seminal case in the wrongful pregnancy area recognized
the truth of that proposition in 1967. The California Court of
Appeal, in Custodio v. Bauer,'" held that the tenth child in the
Custodio family might well feel more loved "if he brings with
him the wherewithal to make it possible."11 7 Furthermore, this
problem could be substantially eliminated by using only the
plaintiff's initials in the report of the case or by some other
method of assuring the plaintiff's anonymity. 148
4. Child Rearing Damages Are Too Speculative
Some courts justify the denial of child rearing damages on
the basis that they are too speculative and uncertain, requiring
prophecy on the part of the fact-finder.149 But, as noted in
Troppi v. Scarf,150 such a calculation is routinely performed in
countless other situations.' 5 ' On this same subject, the Maryland
Court of Appeals in Jones v. Malinowski 52 noted that such a
computation is based upon foreseeable factors relating to the
maintenance, support, and educational expenses which the par-
ents will incur until the child reaches majority. 53 Thus there is a
more definite, less speculative time period involved than in
many malpractice actions, and such damages can be calculated
in accordance with economic factors which are in ordinary use
by actuaries for estate planners and insurance companies. 5"
These expenses should also be very familiar, and therefore more
susceptible of estimation, to the average juror who may have
similar expenses of his own.'55
145. Id. at 725.
146. 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967).
147. Id. at 325, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 477.
148. See, e.g., James G. v. Caserta, 332 S.E.2d 872, 874 n.1 (W. Va. 1985).
149. See, e.g., Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d 8, 12 (Del. 1975).
150. 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971).
151. Id. at 261, 187 N.W.2d at 520-21.
152. 299 Md. 257, 473 A.2d 429 (1984).
153. Id. at 272, 473 A.2d at 436.
154. Id.
155. Id.
[Vol. 8:313
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol8/iss2/4
WRONGFUL PREGNANCY
It would seem obvious that the damages associated with loss
of use of a hand or leg would be far more difficult to quantify
than those associated with child rearing. Even an opponent of
child rearing damages has admitted that they are far easier to
prove than pain, suffering, and mental anguish, which are rou-
tinely allowed. 5 Admittedly, the most difficult calculation in-
volves the offsetting benefits of parenthood. But such a compu-
tation is not impossible, particularly if the benefits are only
offset against damages to the same interest injured. 157 Indeed,
such an offset is similar to items of damage such as loss of soci-
ety, companionship, parental care, attention, and guidance,
which are often calculated and allowed in wrongful death
cases.'
5 8
5. Such Awards Are Out of Proportion to the Negligent
Act
A related reason for the denial of child rearing damages has
been that such awards are unfair and unduly burdensome to the
negligent party because they are out of proportion to his negli-
gent act. 59 This reasoning has been rejected, again even by op-
ponents of these damages, who do not see the court's role as
merely the insulator of the medical malpractice tortfeasor."'6
Such defendants should not be immunized from reasonably fore-
seeable damages, such as the expenses of raising the child, "sim-
ply because it may be burdensome."'' Such a judgment would
limit damages to a relatively insignificant portion of the total
expense flowing from the negligent act.'62
Furthermore, in recent wrongful pregnancy cases, when the
courts have reported the amount of the child rearing damages
either requested by or awarded to the plaintiffs, such amounts
156. See infra note 382.
157. See infra notes 185-195 and accompanying text.
158. See, e.g., Jones v. Malinowski, 299 Md. 257, 272, 473 A.2d 429, 437 (1984).
159. See, e.g., McKernan v. Aasheim, 102 Wash. 2d 411, 415, 687 P.2d 850, 852
(1984).
160. Id. at 418, 687 P.2d at 854. "It is not our place to deny recovery of certain
damages merely in order to insulate health care providers from the shock of big tort
judgments." Id.
161. Schork v. Huber, 648 S.W.2d 861, 867 (Ky. 1983) (Leibson, J., dissenting).
162. Id.
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have not approached the awards for other serious tort cases. For
example, in Morris v. Frudenfeld,163 a 1982 California case, child
rearing and educational damages were reported to be $90,000.164
In Ochs v. Borrelli,'15 a 1982 Connecticut case, they were
$56,375.'"6 In Hartke v. McKelway, 17 a 1981 federal case from
the District of Columbia District Court, such damages were
$200,000.'1 8 In Jones v. Malinowski, e'" a 1984 Maryland case,
the total award was $70,000 with the portion for child rearing
included but not specified. 171 In Clapham v. Yanga,'7 1 a 1981
Michigan case, child rearing damages were reported at
$57,000.'17 Finally, in Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic,173 a 1977
Minnesota case, a general verdict including child rearing costs
was awarded for $19,500.174 In contrast to these figures, a 1985
study of damages awarded during 1978 for serious injuries in-
volving permanent change reported an average award of more
than $349,000.175
6. Such Awards Will Promote Fraudulent Claims
Courts also write that the fear of fraudulent claims is a rea-
son for disallowing child rearing damages. 17 Once again, the ar-
gument betrays a lack of confidence in the efficacy of our court
and jury system. Such fear should be and has been rejected by
other courts: "We will not presuppose that courts are so ineffec-
tual and the jury system so imperfect that fraudulent claims
cannot be distinguished from the legitimate.1' 77 Such fears
163. 135 Cal. App. 3d 23, 185 Cal. Rptr. 76 (1982).
164. Id. at 37, 185 Cal. Rptr. at 83-84.
165. 187 Conn. 253, 445 A.2d 883 (1982).
166. Id. at 255, 445 A.2d at 884.
167. 526 F. Supp. 97 (D.C. Dist. Ct. 1981).
168. Id. at 99.
169. 299 Md. 257, 473 A.2d 429 (1984).
170. Id. at 262, 473 A.2d at 431.
171. 102 Mich. App. 47, 300 N.W.2d 727 (1980).
172. Id. at 50, 300 N.W.2d at 729.
173. 260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977).
174. Id. at 171.
175. See P.M. DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (1985). Danzon states that injuries
involving permanent grave change resulted in an average award of $349,203 in 1978. Id.
at 152.
176. See, e.g., Beardsley v. Wierdsma, 650 P.2d 288, 292 (Wyo. 1982).
177. McKernan v. Aasheim, 102 Wash. 2d 411, 418, 687 P.2d 850, 854 (1984) (citing
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should not have a bearing on whether or not a worthy plaintiff
received a valid damage award.
7. The Legislature, Not the Courts, Should Decide
Some courts would leave this issue to the calm contempla-
tion of the legislature rather than to the fact-finder. 17 8 That ar-
gument might have merit if these damages were being treated as
just one more item on the overall agenda for medical malprac-
tice reform. But while we await such legislative reform, there is
no reason to single out for denial this one particular element of
damage in this one particular medical malpractice cause of
action.
In summary, the various public policy arguments present a
weak case for withholding child rearing damages in wrongful
pregnancy malpractice actions. While specific rebuttals to each
point can be readily justified,7 9 the important consideration
that underlies all of the rebuttals is that there is no good reason
to treat this malpractice action in a different manner than any
other malpractice action.18
It is obviously foreseeable that a negligently performed ster-
ilization procedure will result in the birth of a child and that the
parents will incur expenses in raising and educating that
child.' ' There is no rational justification for singling out this
cause of action from the common law rule requiring liability of
the tortfeasor for damages that are the foreseeable result of his
negligence. 82 Due care should be encouraged in all medical pro-
cedures, and by allowing plaintiffs the "prospect of full compen-
sation for negligence,"18 due care will be further encouraged.
Thus, a much stronger public policy argument can be raised in
favor of granting child rearing damages than can be raised in
Freehe v. Freehe, 81 Wash. 2d 183, 189, 500 P.2d 771 (1972)).
178. See, e.g., Schork v. Huber, 648 S.W.2d 861, 863 (Kan. 1983).
179. See supra notes 130-178 and accompanying text.
180. Flowers v. District of Columbia, 478 A.2d 1073, 1082-83 (D.C. 1984) (Ferren, J.,
dissenting).
181. Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 95 Ill. 2d 193, 207, 447 N.E.2d 385, 393 (1983)
(Clark, J., dissenting).
182. Macomber v. Dillman, 505 A.2d 810, 814 (Me. 1986) (Scolnik, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
183. Flowers v. District of Columbia, 478 A.2d 1073, 1082 (D.C. 1984).
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opposition to such damages: full damages are necessary to dis-
courage all forms of negligently performed surgical proce-
dures.184
B. Offset of Benefits: The "Same Interest" Rule of Section 920
Several courts, in an apparent attempt to lessen what they
regard as unduly burdensome damage awards, have developed
an unusual application of a standard tort damages rule. Section
920 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts states:
When the defendant's tortious conduct has caused harm to the
plaintiff or to his property and in so doing has conferred a special
benefit to the interest of the plaintiff that was harmed, the value
of the benefit conferred is considered in mitigation of damages, to
the extent that this is equitable. 8"
Comment b to this section states:
Limitation to same interest. Damages resulting from an invasion
of one interest are not diminished by showing that another inter-
est has been benefited. Thus one who has harmed another's repu-
tation by defamatory statements cannot show in mitigation of
damages that the other has been financially benefited from their
publication ... unless damages are claimed for harm to pecuniary
interests .... Damages for pain and suffering are not diminished
by showing that the earning capacity of the plaintiff has been in-
creased by the defendant's act .... Damages to a husband for
loss of consortium are not diminished by the fact that the hus-
band is no longer under the expense of supporting the wife.""0
As noted in Part II of this Comment, 8 7 some courts have argued
that there should be a broad interpretation of the interest in-
volved in these actions and that the emotional benefits of
parenthood should be used to offset the pecuniary damages pre-
sent in child rearing.188 These courts would consider all financial
burdens and emotional benefits as part of the same "family
interest."' 89
184. Beardsley v. Wierdsma, 650 P.2d 288, 295 (Wyo. 1982).
185. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 (1977).
186. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 comment b (1977).
187. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
188. See, e.g., Comment, One More Mouth to Feed, supra note 56, at 1075.
189. See, e.g., Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 256-57, 187 N.W.2d 511, 518-19
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Several commentators have argued against this view,190
which can produce harsh results for plaintiffs who may get no
recovery at all since juries are likely to value the emotional ben-
efits of parenthood very highly. It seems clear from the illustra-
tions in comment b to section 920 that the drafters of this sec-
tion clearly meant to show that physical, emotional, and
economic injuries were harms to separate interests. 91 The better
view was adopted in Custodio,'92 where the court held that emo-
tional benefits should only offset emotional injuries. 9 3 Yet the
Arizona Supreme Court, in University of Arizona Health Sci-
ences Center v. Superior Court,94 adopted the opposite theory.
There, the court argued that a "strict interpretation" of the
''same interest" limitation would result in the unjust enrichment
of the plaintiff. 95
But the Custodio reading of section 920 should not be re-
garded as a "strict interpretation." Indeed, a fair reading of that
section and the accompanying comments can only lead one to
the conclusion that the Custodio interpretation is the normal in-
terpretation. And, contrary to the Arizona opinion, anything
other than such a normal interpretation will lead to the unjust
enrichment of the tortfeasor.
C. Mitigation: The "Avoidance of Consequences" Rule of Sec-
tion 918
Finally, some courts have addressed the issue of whether, in
accordance with Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 918, the
plaintiffs in a wrongful pregnancy action should recover child
rearing costs when they could have mitigated those damages ei-
ther by submitting to an abortion or by putting the child up for
adoption. 96 Section 918 states:
(1) Except as stated in Subsection (2), one injured by the tort of
(1971). See also supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
190. See, e.g., Cheslik, supra note 5; Comment, supra note 4; and Comment, supra
note 56.
191. See Comment, supra note 56, at 1324.
192. 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967).
193. Id. at 323, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 476.
194. 136 Ariz. 579, 667 P.2d 1294 (1983).
195. Id. at 584 n.4, 667 P.2d at 1294 n.4.
196. See, e.g., Kingsbury v. Smith, 122 N.H. 237, 243, 442 A.2d 1003, 1006 (1982).
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another is not entitled to recover damages for any harm that he
could have avoided by the use of reasonable effort or expenditure
after the commission of the tort.
(2) One is not prevented from recovering damages for a particu-
lar harm resulting from a tort if the tortfeasor intended the harm
or was aware of it and was recklessly disregardful of it, unless the
injured person with knowledge of the danger of the harm inten-
tionally or heedlessly failed to protect his own interests.19
Section 918 suggests only that mitigation be accomplished by
the reasonable effort of the injured party. 98 Many would argue
that it is unreasonable to require a plaintiff in such an emotion-
ally charged situation to make such an onerous choice.' 9 9 The
better view, however, is that such a determination of reasonable-
ness is traditionally the role of the fact-finder.2 00 The jury
should consider such factors as the parents' religious beliefs, the
mother's health, and the trimester stage at which the pregnancy
was discovered in making its determination on the reasonable-
ness of the application of this doctrine.20'
V. Conclusion
Although the trend in wrongful pregnancy cases is in the
opposite direction, logic and adherence to fundamental tort
principles would be preferable to vague reference to public pol-
icy. This Comment argues that such principles will eventually
find their way back into the common law of this country with
regard to this tort. For instance, it would seem inevitable that in
197. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 918 (1977).
198. Id.
199. Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 95 Ill. 2d 193, 207, 447 N.W.2d 385, 392 (1983)
(Clark, J., dissenting):
Nor should the parents be forced to mitigate damages by choosing abortion or
adoption. They chose not to conceive a child. It is quite a different situation to ask
a couple, once a child has been conceived, to abort, or to put the child up for
adoption, indicating that if they failed to do either they would assume full respon-
sibility of any and all costs of that child. If parents are confronted in such a situa-
tion with choices that they consider to be unenviable alternatives, they should not
be precluded from recovering damages because they select the most desirable of
these unpalatable choices.
Id. (citations omitted).
200. Comment, Wrongful Birth: The Avoidance of Consequences Doctrine in Miti-
gation of Damages, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 1107, 1119 (1985).
201. Id.
[Vol. 8:313
26http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol8/iss2/4
WRONGFUL PREGNANCY
states that allow child rearing damages for children who are
born with various physical or mental disabilities, the courts will
eventually be forced to allow the same damages for normal chil-
dren. Otherwise, where will the courts draw the line when chil-
dren are born with mild defects?"'
It is also the view of this Comment that wrongful pregnancy
should be treated, for purposes of awarding damages, like any
other medical malpractice action. Damages should be awarded
for all foreseeable consequences of the negligence, including
child rearing. Courts should take into account the reasons why
the couple chose sterilization. If the couple chose sterilization to
prevent physical injury to the mother or the child, and such in-
jury did not occur, damages should not be allowed. On the other
hand, if the reason for the sterilization was the economic conse-
quence of the additional child upon the family finances, the un-
desired birth will have brought about such consequences and,
assuming that negligence has been proven by the plaintiff, the
damage should be regarded as the foreseeable result of the
tortfeasor's negligent act.
The economic benefits of the addition of the child to the
family, rarer in an urban society than was the case when chil-
dren performed agricultural tasks,0 3 would be offset against the
economic damages occasioned by child rearing. The emotional
benefits of parenthood should be offset against any emotional
damages claimed by the parents. Similarly, the physical benefits
to the parents of parenthood should be offset against physical
injury occasioned by the pregnancy and birth. The jury should
be allowed to determine whether the plaintiffs should have miti-
gated their damages by opting for adoption or abortion, taking
into account in their deliberation on the reasonableness of such
options any factors that might specifically relate to the parents
or the situation in question.
David J. Burke
202. Mason v. Western Pennsylvania Hosp., 499 Pa. 484, 488-89, 453 A.2d 974, 977
(1982) (O'Brien, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
203. See infra note 290.
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Appendix: A State-by-State Guide To Wrongful
Pregnancy Damages
Alabama
Leading Case: Boone v. Mullendore. °4
Court: Supreme Court of Alabama (highest court).
Basic Facts: The plaintiff underwent exploratory surgery due
to cramps in her abdomen. The defendant physician told her
later that he had removed her Fallopian tubes. The plaintiff,
therefore, did not use contraceptives, became pregnant, and de-
livered a healthy child.205
Holding on Damages: allowed, including:
1. patient's hospital expenses;
2. physicial pain and suffering;
3. mental anguish of patient;
4. loss to husband of comfort, companionship, services, and
consortium;
5. medical expenses incurred by patient and husband.2 6
Opinion by: Chief Justice Torbert; Justices Maddox, Almon,
Shores, Embry, Beatty, and Adams concurred.
Concurring specially: Justice Faulkner would have assessed
damages under the "benefit" rule whereby child rearing damages
would be allowed and would be offset by benefits accruing to the
family as a result of the birth.0 7
Concurring specially: Justices Jones and Shores wrote to am-
plify on the rationale for the rejection of the "benefit" rule.20 8
204. 416 So. 2d 718 (Ala. 1982).
205. Id. at 719.
206. Id. at 723.
207. Id. at 725-26 (Faulkner, J., concurring specially).
208. Id. at 728 (Jones & Shores, JJ., concurring specially).
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Alaska
No cases on this issue were found.
Arizona
Leading case: University of Arizona Health Sciences Center
v. Superior Court.20 9
Court: Supreme Court of Arizona (highest court).
Basic Facts: The plaintiffs were the parents of three children
and decided they could afford no more. The plaintiff husband
underwent a vasectomy procedure but the plaintiff wife became
pregnant thereafter. The plaintiffs had a fourth healthy child
and sued the physician and his employer (the hospital) for dam-
ages for negligence.21 0
Holding on Damages: All damages were permitted including
future costs of rearing and educating the child.211 The offset of
the benefits which the parents will receive from the parental re-
lationship must also be considered. 21 2 The parents' reasons for
desiring sterilization are relevant to the issue, 1 3 as well as family
size, income, age of parents, and marital status.214 Parents need
not mitigate damages by adoption or abortion.215
209. 136 Ariz. 579, 667 P.2d 1294 (1983).
210. Id. at 581, 667 P.2d at 1296.
211. Id. at 584-86, 667 P.2d at 1299-1301.
212. Id. at 584-85, 667 P.2d at 1299.
213. Id. at 585, 667 P.2d at 1300:
For example, where the parent sought sterilization in order to avoid the danger of
genetic defect, the jury could easily find that the uneventful birth of a healthy,
non-defective child was a blessing rather than a "damage". Such evidence should
be admissible, and the rule which we adopt will allow the jury to learn all the
factors relevant to the determination of whether there has been any real damage
and, if so, how much.
Id.
214. Id. at 585, 667 P.2d at 1300 (quoting Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187
N.W.2d 511, 519 (1971), where the court included these factors as those "which the trier
must consider in determining the extent to which the birth of a particular child repre-
sents a benefit to his parents.").
215. Id. at 586 n.5, 667 P.2d at 1301 n.5:
The rules requiring mitigation of damages require only that reasonable measures
be taken. The decision not to conceive a child is quite different from the decision
to abort or put the child up for adoption once it has been conceived. "If parents
are confronted in such a situation with choices which they consider to be unenvi-
able alternatives, they should not be precluded from recovering damages because
they select the most desirable of these unpalatable choices."
29
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Opinion by: Justice Feldman; Chief Justice Holohan and Jus-
tice Hays concurred.
Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part: Vice Chief
Justice Gordon would only have allowed child rearing damages
in the case of a "seriously retarded, deformed, or chronically ill"
child. 16
Arkansas
Leading Case: Wilbur v. Kerr.217
Court: Supreme Court of Arkansas (highest court).
Basic Facts: The plaintiff husband sought a vasectomy in or-
der to prevent further children. The two procedures performed
by the defendant physician were unsuccessful and the plaintiff
wife gave birth to a normal healthy daughter.2 18
Holding on Damages: The physician was held responsible for
"any and all proper damages connected with the operation and
connected with the pregnancy."219 The court, however, denied
the claim for child rearing damages on the basis of public
policy. 220
Opinion by: Justice Hickman.
Dissenting Opinion by: Justice Dudley, with Chief Justice
Adkisson joining, would have allowed the child rearing damages
and allowed the jury to offset the value of parenthood by the use
of the benefit rule.221
Id. (quoting Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 95 Ill. 2d 193, 207, 447 N.E.2d 385, 392 (Clark, J.,
dissenting)) (citation omitted).
216. Id. at 586, 667 P.2d at 1301 (Gordon, V.C.J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). Vice Chief Justice Gordon states: "But here we are dealing with the birth of a
normal and healthy, although undesired, child whose life I consider above monetary
value." Id.
217. 275 Ark. 239, 628 S.W.2d 568 (1982).
218. Id. at 239-40, 628 S.W.2d at 569.
219. Id. at 244, 628 S.W.2d at 571.
220. Id.
[Bleing an unwanted or "emotional bastard," who will some day learn that its
parents did not want it and, in fact, went to court to force someone else to pay for
its raising, will be harmful to that child. It will undermine society's need. for a
strong and healthy family relationship.
Id.
221. Id. at 246, 628 S.W.2d at 572-73 (Dudley, J., dissenting). Justice Dudley wrote:
"A public policy which subtly encourages abortion or adoption, as today's holding neces-
sarily does, is inconsistent with the stated goal of family stability and has no logical
30http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol8/iss2/4
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California
Leading Case: Custodio v. Bauer.222
Court: California Court of Appeal, First District, Division 1 (in-
termediate appellate court).
Basic Facts: The plaintiffs, parents of nine children, agreed
with the defendant physicians that the plaintiff wife should have
her Fallopian tubes removed. The operation failed, and the
plaintiff wife became pregnant.223
Holding on Damages: Damages would be allowed for the
costs of the unsuccessful operation,224 physical complications,225
mental, physical and nervous pain and suffering,220 measurable
economic changes in the status of other family members, 227 and
child rearing costs offset by any benefit received. 28
Opinion by: Associate Justice Sims; Justices Molinari and Elk-
ington concurred.
Colorado
No cases were found.
Connecticut
Leading Case: Ochs v. Borrelli.29
Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut (highest court).
Basic Facts: The plaintiff was the mother of two children born
with orthopedic defects. 23 0 She arranged with the defendant
physician for a tubal ligation. The operation was performed but
the plaintiff became pregnant, giving birth to a third child, also
with mild orthopedic defects. The plaintiff subsequently under-
sense of conscience." Id. at 246, 628 S.W.2d at 572.
222. 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967).
223. Id. at 307-08, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 465-66.
224. Id. at 322, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 475.
225. Id. at 322-23, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 476.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 323-24, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 476.
228. Id. at 323, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 476. "If the failure of the sterilization operation and
the ensuing pregnancy benefited the wife's emotional and nervous makeup.., the de-
fendants should be able to offset it." Id.
229. 187 Conn. 253, 445 A.2d 883 (1982).
230. Id. at 254-55, 445 A.2d at 883-84.
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went a second successful sterilization.2 31
Holding on Damages: Damages were allowed for medical ex-
penses, pain and suffering due to the failed sterilization, the
costs of correcting the orthopedic defects, and the cost of raising
the child to majority.3 2 The court also decided that $49,985 for
the plaintiff's medical expenses, and pain and suffering were not
excessive,233 and that the trial judge had correctly charged the
jury.23
Opinion by: Associate Justice Peters; Justices Healey, Pankey,
Armentano, and Shea concurred.
Delaware
Leading Case: Coleman v. Garrison.2 35
Court: Supreme Court of Delaware (highest court).
Basic Facts: The plaintiffs were the husband, wife, and five
children of this family. The plaintiff wife had undergone a tubal
ligation which failed and she gave birth to a sixth child. The
plaintiffs sued the physician and the hospital where the surgery
was performed.3 6
Holding on Damages: The supreme court let stand the lower
court's ruling which allowed damages for the pain and suffering
by the wife resulting from the pregnancy, the medical expenses
for the pregnancy and the tubal ligation, and loss of consortium
by the husband.2 3 No damages were awarded to the newborn's
siblings.2 38 Child rearing damages were disallowed on the ground
of public policy.239
231. Although this case involves the unplanned birth of a slightly deformed child,
the court followed the case law from other jurisidictions relative to the birth of healthy,
normal children in reaching its decision. See id. at 257-58, 445 A.2d at 885. Furthermore,
the child's orthopedic problems were almost completely corrected and played no part in
the determination regarding what types of damages would be awarded. See id. at 255 n.2,
445 A.2d at 884 n.2. Therefore, the case is included here as the leading case in this
jurisdiction.
232. Id. at 255-61, 445 A.2d at 884-86.
233. Id. at 255, 261, 445 A.2d at 884, 886.
234. Id. at 259-60, 445 A.2d at 886.
235. 349 A.2d 8 (Del. 1975).
236. Id. at 9.
237. Id. at 11 n.5.
238. Id. at 14 n.10.
239. Id. at 12. The court stated:
[Ilt is settled Delaware law that recovery may not be had for damages which are
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Opinion by: Justice Duffy; Justice McNeilly and Vice Chancel-
lor Brown concurred.
District of Columbia
Leading Case: Flowers v. District of Columbia.2 40
Court: District of Columbia Court of Appeals (highest court).
Basic Facts: The plaintiff, after giving birth to her third child,
determined that she could afford no more. A tubal cauterization
was performed upon the plaintiff by two physicians who were
agents of the District of Columbia. The procedure failed, and
plaintiff became pregnant. She gave birth to her fourth child
and sued the District of Columbia for negligence under the prin-
ciple of respondeat superior.2 4
Holding on Damages: The court let stand the lower court's
ruling which allowed damages for the mother's medical ex-
penses, pain and suffering, and lost wages (both during preg-
nancy and immediately thereafter until she was able to return to
work), as well as the cost of a future tubal ligation.242 These
damages amounted to a total of $11,000.243 Child rearing dam-
ages were denied because the court was reluctant to apply the
normal tort benefit rule and avoidance of consequences rule to a
situation involving "all highly personal matters that seem partic-
ularly unsuited for the traditional adversarial process of a negli-
gence action in a court of law."2 44
speculative or conjectural. And that applies to any attempt to measure the value
of a human life against its costs. . . . We respect the efforts of other Courts to
provide a remedy .... But, in our view, any attempt to apply it at birth can only
be an exercise in prophecy, an undertaking not within the speciality of our fact-
finders.
Id. (citations omitted).
240. 478 A.2d 1073 (D.C. 1984).
241. Id. at 1074.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 1077. See also id. at 1076-77. The court stated that if the benefits rule
were applied,
a parent seeking to recover for an unplanned child will be strongly tempted to
denigrate the child's value to the extent possible in order to obtain as large a
recovery as possible.
Applying ... [the avoidance of consequences] rule to the wrongful birth case
would mean that a plaintiff could recover for damages only if he could demon-
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Opinion by: Associate Judge Kern, Retired. "
Dissenting Opinion: Associate Judge Ferren would have al-
lowed child rearing damages as the foreseeable consequences of
the negligence involved.24 He also made strong arguments
against the majority's fear of the application of the benefit rule
and the rule on avoidance of consequences.247
Florida
Leading Case: Fassoulas v. Ramey. 48
Court: Supreme Court of Florida (highest court).
Basic Facts: The plaintiffs were the parents of two children
who had been born with severe congenital abnormalities. They
decided not to have any more children due to their fear of future
abnormalities and due to the high cost of medical care that
might ensue. The defendant physician performed a vasectomy
on the husband but the wife later became pregnant twice, the
first time giving birth to an abnormal child and the second time
giving birth to a normal child. The plaintiffs then sued the de-
fendant for negligence. 49
Holding on Damages: The court let stand the lower court's
ruling allowing damages for the wife's past and future wages,
emotional distress, and loss of consortium, and for the husband's
emotional distress, loss of consortium, and medical and hospital
strate to the court and jury that he could not have reasonably avoided the conse-
quences . . . by abortion . .. [or] to place the child for adoption ....
Id.
245. Id. at 1074 (listing an unnumbered footnote which states that "Judge Kern was
an Associate Judge of the court at the time of argument. His status changed to Associate
Judge, Retired, on May 25, 1984.").
246. Id. at 1078 (Ferren, J., dissenting). See also id. at 1082-83:
There is no less reason to encourage due care in sterilization operations, through
the prospect of full compensation for negligence, than there is in other areas of
medical care.
In barring recovery of child rearing costs after a negligent sterilization, when
a family can prove that economic necessity motivated the operation, this court in
effect concludes that all will be well enough for the family, and thus that the
persons responsible need not pay for the foreseeable consequences of their tortious
conduct.
Id.
247. Id. at 1078-83.
248. 450 So. 2d 822 (Fla. 1984).
249. Id. at 822-23.
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expenses. 50 Child rearing damages were disallowed based upon
public policy. '51
Opinion by: Per curiam opinion concurred in by Chief Justice
Alderman, and Justices Boyd, Overton, and McDonald.
Dissenting Opinion by: Justice Ehrlich; Justices Adkins and
Shaw concurred. The dissenters would have allowed child rear-
ing damages with an offset for the benefits of parenthood. 5'
Georgia
Leading Case: Fulton-DeKalb Hospital Authority v.
Graves.15 1
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia (highest court).
Basic Facts: The plaintiff gave birth to a daughter in 1979 and
subsequently underwent a sterilization procedure performed by
a physician employed at defendant hospital.2 " The procedure
failed, and the plaintiff later gave birth to a child with a "club
foot." She sued the hospital for negligence. '55
Holding on Damages: Damages were allowed for the unsuc-
cessful sterilization procedure, pain and suffering, medical com-
plications, cost of delivery, lost wages, and loss of consortium.215
Damages for child rearing expenses were denied on public policy
grounds.257
Opinion by: Justice Clark.
Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part: Justices Mar-
shall and Bell concurred in the denial of child rearing damages,
dissented from the decision to recognize the cause of action in
250. Id. at 823.
251. Id. at 823-24.
See also id. at 823 (quoting Ramey v. Fassoulas, 414 So. 2d 198, 200 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)
stating, " '[t]he child is still the child of the parents, not the physician, and it is the
parents' legal obligation, not the physician's, to support the child.' ").
252. Id. at 824-30 (Ehrlich, J., dissenting).
253. 252 Ga. 441, 314 S.E.2d 653 (1984).
254. Id. at 442, 314 S.E.2d at 654.
255. As noted with regard to Ochs v. Borrelli, supra note 231, this case also involves
a slightly deformed child, but the court followed case law from other jurisdictions rela-
tive to the birth of normal, healthy children in reaching its decision. See id. at 442, 314
S.E.2d at 654. For this reason the case is included here as the leading case in this
jurisdiction.
256. 252 Ga. at 443, 314 S.E.2d at 654.
257. Id. at 444-45, 314 S.E.2d at 655-56 ("parent cannot be said to have suffered an
injury in the birth of a child").
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Georgia, and dissented from the decision to grant any damages,
without opinion.258
Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part: Justices
Smith and Gregory concurred in the recognition of the cause of
action and in the granting of damages, but dissented from the
denial of child rearing damages, with an opinion by Justice
Gregory.25
Hawaii
No cases were found.
Idaho
No cases were found.
Illinois
Leading Case: Cockrum v. Baumgartner. 0
Court: Supreme Court of Illinois (highest court).
Basic Facts: Two cases were consolidated on appeal. In both
cases, the plaintiffs were married couples who alleged negligence
in the performance of sterilization procedures; one case involved
a vasectomy and the other a tubal ligation. In both cases, the
wives became pregnant and gave birth to healthy children. One
couple sued the physician and a laboratory which tested the
sperm of the vasectomy patient, while the second couple sued
the physician and the hospital where the tubal ligation was
performed. 61
Holding on Damages: Damages were allowed, including pain
of childbirth, time lost in having the child, and medical ex-
penses.262 Child rearing damages were denied on the basis of
258. Id. at 442-45, 314 S.E.2d at 654-56 (Marshall & Bell, JJ., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
259. Id. at 445-46, 314 S.E.2d at 656 (Smith & Gregory, JJ., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). "Clearly the foreseeable consequences of a wrongful birth include the
expenses of raising the child to the age of majority." Id. (citations omitted).
260. 95 Ill. 2d 193, 447 N.E.2d 385, cert. denied, Raja v. Michael Reese Hosp., 464
U.S. 846 (1983).
261. Id. at 194-96, 447 N.E.2d at 386-87.
262. Id. at 194-95, 447 N.E.2d at 386.
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public policy. 26
Opinion by: Justice Ward.
Dissenting Opinion by: Justice Clark; Justice Simon joining.
The dissenters saw the majority position as inconsistent because
it stated that the birth of a normal child is not an injury to the
parents, but allowed some damages to be recovered.264 The dis-
sent stated that the right to limit procreation is constitutionally
protected. 65 The child rearing expenses are a foreseeable result
of the physician's negligence, 6 and such costs should be allowed
with an appropriate offset for the benefits of parenthood.2 7
Indiana
Leading Case: Garrison v. Foy.268
Court: Court of Appeals of Indiana, Third District (intermedi-
ate appellate court).
Basic Facts: The plaintiff husband underwent a vasectomy
263. Id. at 201, 447 N.E.2d at 390.
One can, of course, in mechanical logic reach a different conclusion, but only on
the ground that human life and the state of parenthood are compensable losses. In
a proper hierarchy of values the benefit of life should not be outweighed by the
expense of supporting it. Respect for life and the rights proceeding from it are at
the heart of our legal system and, broader still, our civilization.
[Ilt is clear that public policy commands the development and the preserva-
tion of family relations .... To permit parents in effect to transfer the costs of
rearing a child would run counter to that policy.
Id. at 200-01, 447 N.E.2d at 389-90 (citation omitted).
264. Id. at 205-06, 447 N.E.2d at 391-92 (Clark & Simon, JJ., dissenting). Justice
Clark states:
If, as the court hypothesizes, the birth of a normal child cannot be construed as an
injury, how then can the plaintiff recover for the "pain" of childbirth? Should,
then, the court characterize the time "lost in having the child" as "lost" time
(which in effect is found to be compensable)? Why then allow for the medical
costs of childbirth if they represent the first installment in an investment in the
preservation and development of family relations? The opinion of the court con-
tradicts itself. Once the court has agreed that the cause of action for wrongful
birth can be brought in Illinois, the policy questions that the opinion grapples
with are moot.
Id. at 205-06, 447 N.E.2d at 392.
265. Id. at 206, 447 N.E.2d at 392 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)).
266. Id. at 207, 447 N.E.2d at 393.
267. Id. at 208-09, 447 N.E.2d at 393.
268. 486 N.E.2d 5 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985).
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performed by the defendant physician.2 69 About one and one-
half years later, the plaintiff wife gave birth to a deformed baby
(complete bilateral cleft of the lip, jaw, and palate). The plaintiff
then sued the defendant physician for negligence. 7°
Holding on Damages: Damages were allowed for the expenses
directly related to the pregnancy such as cost of the unsuccessful
vasectomy, pain and suffering, medical complications from the
pregnancy, cost of delivery, lost wages, and loss of consortium.2 7 1
Child rearing costs were denied because of public policy
considerations.272
Opinion by: Judge Hoffman; Judge Garrard concurred; Judge
Staton concurred in the result.
Iowa
Leading Case: Nanke v. Napier.273
Court: Supreme Court of Iowa (highest court).
Basic Facts: The plaintiff sued the defendant physician for
negligence in the performance of a therapeutic abortion which
resulted in the birth of a normal healthy child.274
Holding on Damages: The plaintiff sought damages for pain
and suffering, medical expenses, lost wages, emotional distress,
and child rearing expenses in the lower court. The lower court
sustained defendant's pretrial motion to dismiss the action for
269. Id. at 7.
270. Although this case involved the unplanned birth of a deformed child, the court
followed the case law from other jurisdictions relative to the birth of healthy, normal
children in reaching its decision. See id. at 8. See also Spoljaric v. Pangan, 466 N.E.2d
37, 38-39, 45-46 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984) where Judge Garrard, writing for the same court in
a case which involved a negligent tubal ligation which resulted in the birth of a normal
child, said:
Because the Spoljarics' claim was barred by the statute of limitations we need
not consider whether their complaint stated a claim upon which relief could have
been granted. However, we see no reason why this action sounding in negligence
should not be heard by a court in this state .... [Cilearly there would be some
damage resulting from an ineffectively performed sterilization.
Id. at 45-46.
271. 486 N.E.2d at 8.
272. Id.
273. 346 N.W.2d 520 (Iowa 1984).
274. Id. at 521. "[T]he factual situation involved in this case would more accurately
be depicted as a claim for 'wrongful pregnancy.' We will regard plaintiff's petition in that
context." Id.
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child rearing damages without ruling on the other damages. The
plaintiff then sought an interlocutory appeal in the Iowa Su-
preme Court. The Iowa Supreme Court denied the child rearing
damages on the basis of public policy.s7
Opinion by: Justice McGiverin.
Dissenting Opinion: Justice Wolle would have viewed dam-
ages as a question of fact, rather than law, relying on instruc-
tions to the jury in traditional tort principles to produce a fair
result. 76
Kansas
Leading Case: Johnston v. Elkins.2 7
Court: Supreme Court of Kansas (highest court).
Basic Facts: The plaintiff underwent a vasectomy, but his wife
became pregnant and gave birth to a normal, healthy child.
They sued the physician and the physician's employer for
negligence.278
Holding on Damages: Damages were allowed for the costs of
the unsuccessful operation, pain and suffering, cost of delivery,
and loss of consortium.279 Child rearing damages had been de-
nied by this court in an earlier case280 and were not at issue
here.281
Opinion by: Justice Miller.
275. Id. at 522-23. "[A] parent cannot be said to have been damaged or injured by
the birth and rearing of a normal, healthy child because the invaluable benefits of
parenthood outweigh the mere monetary burdens as a matter of law." Id. (citations
omitted).
276. Id. at 523-24 (Wolle, J., dissenting).
The majority opinion of this court forecloses the plaintiff from moving be-
yond the bare allegations of her petition and proving such relevant facts on this
issue of damages as her own unique socio-economic circumstances and the reasons
why she wished to delay her raising of a child. We have heretofore recognized the
unique character of each parent-child relationship that may be involved in the
assessment of damages to a parent ....
Id. at 524.
277. 241 Kan. 407, 736 P.2d 935 (1987).
278. Id. at 408, 736 P.2d at 937.
279. Id. at 413, 736 P.2d at 940.
280. See Byrd v. Wesley Medical Center, 237 Kan. 215, 699 P.2d 459 (1985).
281. 241 Kan. 407, 410, 736 P.2d 935, 938.
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Kentucky
Leading Case: Schork v. Huber.2 82
Court: Supreme Court of Kentucky (highest court).
Basic Facts: The plaintiff wife underwent an unsuccessful
sterilization procedure performed by the defendant physician.
The plaintiff couple sued the physician for negligence when a
healthy baby was born the following year.283
Holding on Damages: The Kentucky Court of Appeals had
previously held, in Maggard v. McKelvey, 28 that damages could
be awarded for "the general and special damages incidental to
the pregnancy and birth, such as, pain and suffering, loss of con-
sortium, medical and hospital expenses, and loss of wages."2 5 In
Schork v. Huber,8 6 the Kentucky Supreme Court agreed with
the lower court's assessment of damages, holding that child rear-
ing damages were disallowed as contrary to public policy.287 Any
change in this policy should come from the legislature.28
Opinion by: Justice Wintersheimer; Chief Justice Stephens and
Justices Aker, Gant, and Stephenson concurred.
Dissenting Opinion: Justice Leibson complained that the ma-
jority was making new public policy, not following established
public policy.28" He would have allowed child rearing damages to
282. 648 S.W.2d 861 (Ky. 1983).
283. Id. at 862.
284. Maggard v. McKelvey, 627 S.W.2d 44 (Ky. App. 1981).
285. Id. at 48.
286. 648 S.W.2d 861.
287. Id. at 863. "Certainly the injured could recover compensation from the negli-
gent, but public policy considerations limit the responsibility of those negligent." Id.
(citations omitted).
288. Id. "The enunciation of public policy is the domain of the General Assembly.
...The courts interpret the law. They do not enact legislation." Id.
289. Id. at 864 (Leibson, J., dissenting).
The duty of this court is to follow public policy, not to formulate it. In Mag-
gard, the Kentucky Court of Appeals formulated policy. It reasoned from the ab-
sence of "a clear expression of public policy (or) some indication from the legisla-
ture" to the conclusion "that our public policy prohibits the extension of liability
to include these damages." My view is just the opposite; that public policy should
not flow from the opinions and beliefs of judges, however well-meaning, absent "a
clear expression of public opinion or some indication from the legislature."
Public policy should not extend to making a judgment, as a matter of law,
that persons have suffered no damages from the foreseeable consequences of a
medical procedure, even though we judges may believe that the emotional benefits
40http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol8/iss2/4
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be awarded as a normal negligence recovery. " '
Dissenting Opinion: Justice Vance would have allowed child
rearing damages with an offset for the benefits to the parents
and, unlike Justice Leibson, would have allowed mental distress
damages because there was the required physical contact during
the operation. " 1
Louisiana
Leading Case: Pitre v. Opelousas General Hospital.9 2
Court: Court of Appeals of Louisiana, Third Circuit (intermedi-
ate appellate court).
Basic Facts: The plaintiffs, husband and wife, decided they
could not afford the expense of having a third child. Therefore,
the defendant performed a tubal ligation on the plaintiff wife.
This procedure failed, however, and a third child was born to
the couple. The child was born with the congenital defect of al-
binism.29 3 The plaintiffs sued the physicians who were involved,
as well as the hospital.29 4
of parenting outweigh the economic consequences.
Id.
290. Id. at 865, 867.
A cause of action in negligence is almost as old as the common law.
Historically, in an agricultural society and in the early days of the industrial
revolution when child labor was the rule rather than the exception, children were
recognized as an economic benefit. That once logical proposition has certainly be-
come illogical in our modern society....
The economic loss attendant to bearing and raising children in our time is as
foreseeable and reasonably determinable as the economic loss from physical injury
that causes impairment or destruction of earning power or the prospect of future
medical expenses....
We cannot absolve a physician of liability for the expense reasonably foresee-
able for the cost of raising the child simply because it may be burdensome. To do
so is to limit the action to a relatively insignificant portion of the damages caused
by his negligence.
Id.
291. Id. at 867 (Vance, J., dissenting).
292. Pitre v. Opelousas Gen. Hosp., No. 87-CC-2360 (La. Sup. Ct. Nov. 30, 1987)
(LEXIS, States library, Omni file).
293. Id. Although this was a case that involved a child born with a congenital defect,
the court noted that its reasoning would have been the same had the child been born in a
healthy condition. See id. For this reason, the case is included here as the leading case in
this jurisdiction.
294. Id.
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Holding on Damages: Recovery was limited to the expenses
of the pregnancy and delivery. Damages for emotional distress
and child rearing were denied because prevention of pregnancy
was not an issue that the public policy of Louisiana had
addressed. " 5
Opinion by: Judge Stoker.
Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part: Judge King
would have allowed both emotional distress and child rearing
damages as the reasonably foreseeable consequences of the de-
fendants' actions.29 He would have used the benefits of
parenthood to mitigate the amount awarded.297
Maine
Leading Case: Macomber v. Dillman.9
Court: Supreme Judicial Court of Maine (highest court).
Basic Facts: The plaintiff couple sued the defendants, physi-
cian and hospital, for a negligently performed tubal ligation re-
sulting in the birth of a healthy child.299
Holding on Damages: Recovery was limited to the hospital
and medical expenses for the sterilization and pregnancy, pain
and suffering, loss of the wife's earnings, and loss of consortium
by the husband. Child rearing damages were disallowed for pub-
lic policy reasons with no further explanation.00
Opinion by: Justice Glassman; Justices McKusick, Nichols, and
Roberts concurred.
Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part: Justice
Scolnik would have allowed child rearing damages,01 leaving any
limitations on normal tort damages to the legislative process.0 2
Justice Scolnik saw the majority opinion as inconsistent: "If...
295. Id.
296. Id. (King, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). "I believe the majority
has mistakenly confused the risk which is not protected, the consequences of
parenthood, with the risk that is protected, the consequences of a negligent act." Id.
297. Id.
298. 505 A.2d 810 (Me. 1986).
299. Id. at 812.
300. Id. at 813. "We hold for reasons of public policy that a parent cannot be said to
have been damaged or injured by the birth and rearing of a healthy, normal child." Id.
301. Id. (Scolnik, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
302. Id. at 816.
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the birth of a child does not constitute an injury, no basis exists
for any award of damages. '" 308
Maryland
Leading Case: Jones v. Malinowski.304
Court: Court of Appeals of Maryland (highest court).
Basic Facts: The plaintiff couple had three children within the
first five years of their marriage, two of whom were born with
physical problems. They determined that they could not afford a
fourth child, and the wife submitted to a tubal ligation per-
formed by the defendant physician. The wife became pregnant
following the operation and gave birth to a healthy fourth child.
The plaintiffs then sued the defendant for negligence.305
Holding on Damages: All foreseeable damages were allowed
including personal injuries and emotional distress, negative ef-
fects on the marital relationship, pain and suffering, medical ex-
penses, and loss of earnings. 6 Child rearing damages were al-
lowed as offset by the benefits derived by the parent.30 7
Opinion by: Chief Justice Murphy; Justices Smith, Eldridge,
Cole, Davidson, Rodowsky, and Couch concurred.
Massachusetts
No cases were found.
Michigan
Leading Case: Troppi v. Scarf.30 8
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals (intermediate appellate
court).
303. Id. at 814.
304. 299 Md. 257, 473 A.2d 429 (1984).
305. Id. at 260-61, 473 A.2d at 430-31.
306. Id. at 261 n.2, 473 A.2d at 431 n.2.
307. Id. at 274, 473 A.2d at 438:
The jury must assess these benefits in light of the circumstances of the partic-
ular case under consideration, taking into account, among other things, family size
and income, age of the parents and other relevant factors in determining the ex-
tent to which the birth of the child represents a benefit to the parents.
Id. at 272, 473 A.2d at 436-37 (citing Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d
511, 519 (1971)).
308. 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971).
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Basic Facts: The plaintiff couple sued a pharmacist who had
negligently supplied the plaintiff wife with a supply of tranquil-
izers instead of the oral contraceptives that the plaintiff's physi-
cian had prescribed. The plaintiff wife became pregnant and de-
livered her eighth child, a healthy son.0 9
Holding on Damages: The court approved damages for medi-
cal and hospital expenses, loss of wages, and pain and suffer-
ing.310 Child rearing expenses were also approved with an offset
for benefitss u to the same interest as the one harmed. 12
Opinion by: Judge Levin, presiding.
Additional Cases: Clapham v. Yanga31 3 and Bushman v.
309. Id. at 244, 187 N.W.2d at 512-13. Although this case involved a negligently
supplied prescription and not a negligently performed sterilization, the court relied upon
sterilization cases to determine its damage award.
[Als yet, no appellate court has passed upon the liability of a pharmacist for negli-
gently dispensing oral contraceptives. Several cases have, indeed, dealt with the
liability of physicians for failure to exercise due care in the therapeutic or elective
sterilization of patients. Because the elements of damage in these cases correspond
to some of the damages prayed for here, the decisions deserve scrutiny.
Id. at 514.
310. Id. at 260-61, 187 N.W.2d at 513, 520-21.
311. Id. at 255, 187 N.W.2d at 518.
The trial courts evidently believed . . . that application of the benefits rule pre-
vents any recovery for the expenses of rearing an unwanted child. This is un-
sound. Such a rule would be the equivalent to declaring that in every case, as a
matter of law, the services and companionship of a child have a dollar equivalent
greater than the economic costs of his support, to say nothing of the inhibitions,
the restrictions, and the pain and suffering caused by pregnancy and the obliga-
tion to rear the child.
Id.
312. Id. "[I]f the defendant's tortious conduct conferred a benefit to the same inter-
est which was harmed by his conduct, the dollar value of the benefit is to be subtracted
from the dollar value of the injury in arriving at the amount of damages properly award-
able." Id. (citing Burtraw v. Clark (Little), 103 Mich. 383, 61 N.W. 552 (1894); 22 AM
JUR. 2D Damages, § 204 (1965); C.T. MCCORMICK, DAMAGES § 40 (1935)).
313. 102 Mich. App. 47, 300 N.W.2d 727 (1980). In Clapham v. Yanga, a fourteen
year old patient and her parents sued a physician for negligently failing to diagnose the
patient's pregnancy. The court, in differentiating Clapham from a wrongful life action,
noted:
. . . Michigan has recognized that liability may be imposed for the child-rearing
costs of a youngster born due to a defendant's negligence .... The award did not
constitute a judgment directly in the child's favor .... The power of disposition
rests in the grandparents with the condition that they be used to provide for Joel
during his minority - precisely the reason damages for the child-rearing costs of
a youngster are ever recoverable.
Id. at 61-62, 300 N.W.2d at 734.
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Burns Clinic Medical Center.""
Minnesota
Leading Case: Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic.31 6
Court: Supreme Court of Minnesota (highest court).
Basic Facts: The plaintiff husband underwent a vasectomy
performed by the defendant physician. 16 The physician negli-
gently told the plaintiff that he was sterile, when in fact testing
had revealed that the plaintiff was not sterile. The plaintiff wife
later gave birth to the couple's eighth child, and they sued the
physician and the facility for negligence."1 7
Holding on Damages: Damages were approved for medical
expenses incident to the birth, pain and suffering, loss of consor-
tium, s1 and the child rearing costs 19 reduced by the benefits
314. 83 Mich. App. 453, 268 N.W.2d 683 (1978). In Bushman v. Burns Clinic Medi-
cal Center, the plaintiff couple sued the physician and hospital for a negligently per-
formed vasectomy resulting in the birth of a healthy child. The parents, however, aban-
doned their claim for child rearing damages prior to trial. The court held that the
benefits rule enunciated in Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511, should
not be applied in cases where child rearing damages are not sought. Id. at 457-58, 268
N.W.2d at 685.
315. 260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977).
316. Id. at 171.
317. Id. at 171 n.1 ("to a lesser extent, the Sherlocks also alleged that the vasectomy
itself had been negligently performed.").
318. Id. at 175.
319. Id. at 175-76.
Ethical and religious considerations aside, it must be recognized that such costs
are a direct financial injury to the parents, no different in immediate effect than
the medical expenses resulting from the wrongful conception and birth of the
child. Although public sentiment may recognize that to the vast majority of par-
ents the long-term and enduring benefits of parenthood outweigh the economic
costs of rearing a healthy child, it would seem myopic to declare today that those
benefits exceed the costs as a matter of law. The use of various birth control meth-
ods by millions of Americans demonstrates an acceptance of the family-planning
concept as an integral aspect of the modern marital relationship .... Compensa-
tory damages for the costs of rearing the child to the age of majority would also, in
our opinion, serve the useful purpose of an added deterrent to negligent perform-
ance of sterilization operations .... Lastly, in the absence of a legislatively granted
immunity or declared public policy governing sterilization, we remain unconvinced
that a physician should be held harmless for the economic costs of supporting an
unplanned child.
Id. But see Hickman v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 396 N.W.2d 10, 14 n.5 (Minn. 1986)
(Supreme Court of Minnesota conjectures that "[uln light of the legislative intent embod-
ied in section 145.424, subdivisions 1 and 2, our reasoning in Sherlock may, perhaps,
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received by the parents.32 0
Opinion by: Justice Rogosheske.
Dissenting Opinion by: Chief Justice Sheran; Justice Peter-
son joined: "[T]he worth of a healthy child to his parents will
always exceed these costs." 821
Mississippi
No cases were found.
Missouri
Leading Case: Miller v. Duhart.s22
Court: Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Division
Three (intermediate appellate court).
Basic Facts: The plaintiff couple had four children and
wanted to avoid having any more. The plaintiff wife, therefore,
underwent a tubal ligation performed by the defendant osteo-
paths. She later became pregnant and the couple, their four pre-
vious children, and the new child sued the osteopaths and the
hospital for negligence.323 The new child's wrongful life claim
was dismissed.2 4 The siblings' claim was similarly dismissed as
not setting forth a valid cause of action. 25 The parents' claim
was ruled to be a valid cause of action for wrongful conception
but was barred by the statute of limitations. 8
Holding on Damages: The court ruled that, if brought within
have been erroneous").
320. 260 N.W.2d 169, 176 (Minn. 1977).
In keeping with the "same interest" limitation of Restatement, Torts, § 920....
and its underlying purpose to prevent unjust enrichment, the trier of fact will
then be required to reduce these costs by the value of the child's aid, comfort, and
society which will benefit the parents for the duration of their lives.
The jury was ... not specifically instructed to offset the value of the child's aid,
comfort, and society against the projected rearing costs. Because of these errors,
we are compelled to reverse and remand for a new trial limited solely to the issue
of damages.
Id.
321. Id. at 177 (Sheran & Peterson, JJ., dissenting).
322. 637 S.W.2d 183 (Mo. App. 1982).
323. Id. at 184.
324. Id. at 187.
325. Id. (citation omitted).
326. Id. at 188.
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the statutory period, compensatory damages could include pre-
natal and postnatal medical expenses, pain and suffering, loss of
consortium, and the cost of a second sterilization procedure.2
Opinion by: Judge Snyder; Judges Reinhard and Crist
concurred.
Montana
No cases were found.
Nebraska
No cases were found.
Nevada
Leading Case: Szekeres ex rel Szekeres v. Robinson.2
Court: Supreme Court of Nevada (highest court).
Basic Facts: The plaintiffs sued the physicians and the hospi-
tal for a negligently performed surgical sterilization procedure
which resulted in the wife becoming pregnant and giving birth
to a healthy child. The child's siblings also sued for damages. 29
Holding on Damages: No damages were allowed for this tort
claim. 30 The case was remanded, however, so that the parents
could pursue a breach of contract claim. 1
Opinion by: Justice Springer; Chief Justice Mowbray, Justices
Gunderson and Steffen, and District Judge Thomas A. Foley
concurred.
New Hampshire
Leading Case: Kingsbury v. Smith.332
Court: Supreme Court of New Hampshire (highest court).
Basic Facts: The plaintiff requested that the defendants per-
form a tubal ligation on the plaintiff wife during delivery of the
327. Id.
328. 715 P.2d 1076 (Nev. 1986).
329. Id. at 1076-77.
330. Id. at 1077. "[I]n Nevada the birth of a normal child is not a civil wrong for
which the court will provide a remedy in the form of an action for damages." Id.
331. Id. at 1077, 1079.
332. 122 N.H. 237, 442 A.2d 1003 (1982).
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plaintiffs' third child because the plaintiffs did not wish to con-
ceive more children. The procedure was performed, but the
plaintiff wife became pregnant again and gave birth to a fourth
healthy child. The plaintiff couple instituted a negligence suit
against the physicians, the hospital, and the professional associ-
ation (corporation).333
Holding on Damages: Recovery of damages was limited to
hospital and medical expenses of the pregnancy, the cost of ster-
ilization, pain and suffering, loss of the mother's wages, and loss
of consortium.3 34 Child rearing damages were denied for public
policy reasons.33 5
Opinion by: Justice Batchelder; all justices concurred.
New Jersey
Leading Case: P. v. Portadin.3 6
Court: Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division (inter-
mediate appellate court).
Basic Facts: The defendant physician obtained the plaintiff
wife's consent to perform a particular kind of sterilization proce-
dure (tubal ligation), but performed instead a different proce-
dure (Fallopian rings). The procedure was unsuccessful, and the
plaintiff wife became pregnant and gave birth to a healthy child.
The plaintiffs sued the defendant physician and the professional
333. Id. at 240, 442 A.2d at 1004.
334. Id. at 243, 442 A.2d at 1006.
335. Id. at 242-43, 442 A.2d at 1006.
[W]e reject the approach that allows unlimited recovery for the costs of raising
the child. The general rationale for unlimited recovery is stated in Cockrum v.
Baumgartner. "Ethical and moral considerations aside, the cause before us is ana-
lytically indistinguishable from an ordinary medical malpractice action." We disa-
gree with the Illinois court, because it is difficult to imagine a malpractice case
which is more readily distinguishable. In no other situation is a new human life
created.
We also reject the theory which limits recovery by the application of the
"benefits" rule .... The application of this compensating factor in cases such as
this is nothing more nor less than the application of an offset to reduce the magni-
tude of verdicts and lessen the monetary shock to the medical tortfeasor and his
insurer. To say that a benefit can be calculated from the total failure of the medi-
cal service or treatment giving rise to the action, based upon its failure, is an illog-
ical extension of an otherwise sound legal proposition.
Id. (citations omitted).
336. 179 N.J. Super. 465, 432 A.2d 556 (1981).
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association (corporation) for negligence. 37
Holding on Damages: The plaintiffs may recover damages for
medical expenses, pain and suffering, lost wages, and loss of con-
sortium.3 Child rearing costs were disallowed on the basis of
public policy."3 9
Opinion by: Judge Michels.
New Mexico
No cases were found.
New York
Leading Case: O'Toole v. Greenberg.3 4 0
Court: Court of Appeals of New York (highest court).
Basic Facts: The plaintiff wife underwent a tubal ligation per-
formed by the defendant physician. The procedure, however,
was unsuccessful, and the plaintiff gave birth to a healthy child.
The plaintiff couple sued the defendant physicians and the
clinic on grounds of negligence. 1
Holding on Damages: During the trial, damages were con-
ceded by the defendants for physical and emotional injuries suf-
fered by the plaintiff wife as a result of the unwanted pregnancy,
for medical expenses associated with the pregnancy, and for the
loss of services claim brought by the plaintiff husband.3"2 Dam-
ages for child rearing were not allowed by the court of appeals as
a matter of public policy.3 4
3
337. Id. at 468, 432 A.2d at 557.
338. Id. at 471-72, 432 A.2d at 559-60.
339. Id. In Portadin, the Superior Court of New Jersey relied on the reasoning of
the New Jersey Supreme Court in Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979), which
involved the birth of a defective child after the negligent physicians failed to inform the
plaintiffs about prenatal tests for diagnosing genetic defects. The Berman decision de-
nied child rearing damages. By relying on Berman, the Portadin court specifically disap-
proved a prior case from the New Jersey Superior Court (Betancourt v. Gaylor, 136 N.J.
Super. 69, 344 A.2d 336 (1975)) in which child rearing damages had been allowed for the
parents of a healthy child, born as a result of an ineffective sterilization procedure. Id. at
472, 432 A.2d at 559.
340. 64 N.Y. 2d 427, 477 N.E.2d 445, 488 N.Y.S.2d 143 (1985).
341. Id. at 429-30, 477 N.E.2d at 446, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 144.
342. Id. at 430 n.2, 477 N.E.2d at 446 n.2, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 144 n.2.
343. Id. at 432, 477 N.E.2d at 448, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 146. "[Tjhe birth of a healthy
child, as but one consequence of defendant's tortious conduct, does not constitute a
19881
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Opinion by: Judge Jasen; Chief Judge Wachtler and Judges
Simons, Kaye, Alexander, and Lynch concurred; Judge Meyer
took no part in the decision.
North Carolina
Leading Case: Jackson v. Bumgardner.3 4
Court: Supreme Court of North Carolina (highest court).
Basic Facts: The plaintiff couple sued the defendant for negli-
gence in replacement of an I.U.D. The replacement was negli-
gently performed, the plaintiff wife became pregnant and gave
birth to a normal child.345
Holding on Damages: Damages were allowed for hospital and
medical expenses for the pregnancy, pain and suffering, lost
wages, and loss of consortium. Expenses for child rearing were
denied as being necessarily based on speculation and conjec-
ture .3  The court noted that any change in these limits should
come from legislative action,347 and that the plaintiff had failed,
in addition, to state an adequate claim for breach of contract.3 4 1
Opinion by: Justice Frye.
Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part: Justice Mar-
tin would have allowed child rearing damages offset by the value
of benefits received by the parents in having a healthy child. 49
harm cognizable at law." Id.
344. 318 N.C. 172, 347 S.E.2d 743 (1986). "[T]he term 'wrongful conception' or
'wrongful pregnancy' has been used to describe cases similar to the instant case." Id. at
178, 347 S.E.2d at 747. Since this decision relies on much of the theory from the case law
regarding wrongful pregnancy or conception, and, indeed, arrives at the majority view-
point on the damage issue, it has been included as the leading case from this jurisdiction.
345. Id. at 174, 347 S.E.2d at 744-45.
346. Id. at 182, 347 S.E.2d at 749-50.
347. Id. at 183, 347 S.E.2d at 750.
348. Id. at 186, 347 S.E.2d at 752.
349. Id. at 189-90, 347 S.E.2d at 753-54. (Martin, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part):
The better practice would be to allow the trial court in the first instance to
address the issue of what damages are recoverable.
The majority has devised a special rule of damages for the benefit of
doctors faced with malpractice claims involving the concept of wrongful preg-
nancy. Defendant doctors should not have a special rule of damages in this type of
medical malpractice case.... Under settled common law principles of this state, a
defendant is responsible for all damages that proximately result from his negli-
gence. Certainly damages should not be eliminated because of difficulty of proof.
50http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol8/iss2/4
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He would also have allowed the plaintiffs to pursue their breach
of contract claim. 50
North Dakota
No cases were found.
Ohio
Leading Case: Bowman v. Davis.151
Court: Supreme Court of Ohio (highest court).
Basic Facts: Negligently performed tubal ligation caused the
plaintiff wife to conceive and give birth to twins, her fifth and
sixth children. One of the twins suffered from congenital abnor-
malities and mental retardation. The other twin was normal and
healthy. The plaintiff parents sued the physician for
negligence.$52
Holding on Damages: Damages were allowed for expenses
from physical complications, pain and suffering, the value of
Mrs. Bowman to her husband (including consortium) and to the
other members of the family during her confinement, expenses
due to the change in family status, and child rearing costs (in-
cluding special care required for the abnormal twin).3 53 There
was no mention by the court of the need to offset parental bene-
fits against the damage award. 54
Opinion by: Per curiam opinion was concurred in by Chief Jus-
If a rule must be formulated at this time, the Court would be well served by
sticking with basic common law rules of damages. Such rules allow plaintiffs to
recover all damages that proximately flow from defendant's negligence ....
Id.
350. Id. at 191, 347 S.E.2d at 754.
351. 48 Ohio St. 2d 41, 356 N.E.2d 496 (1976).
352. Id. at 41-42, 356 N.E.2d at 497.
353. Id. at 42-43, 356 N.E.2d at 497.
354. Id. at 46, 356 N.E.2d at 499:
The choice not to procreate, as part of one's right to privacy, has become (subject
to certain limitations) a Constitutional guarantee. See Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); and Doe v. Bolton, 410
U.S. 179 (1973). For this court to endorse a policy that makes physicians liable for
the foreseeable consequences of all negligently performed operations except those
involving sterilization would constitute an impermissible infringement of a funda-
mental right.
1988]
51
PACE LAW REVIEW
tice O'Neill and Justices Herbert, Stern, W. Brown, and P.
Brown.
Dissenting: Justices Corrigan and Celebrezze dissented with-
out opinion.
Oklahoma
Leading Case: Morris v. Sanchez. 55
Court: Supreme Court of Oklahoma (highest court).
Basic Facts: This was a consolidation of two cases, each of
which involved the failure of a tubal ligation with the resultant
birth of a healthy child. The cases were brought in federal dis-
trict court in Oklahoma. Questions of law were then certified to
the Supreme Court of Oklahoma regarding the nature of dam-
ages which might be sought in this kind of medical malpractice
case.
356
Holding on Damages: Child rearing damages were not al-
lowed. No other damages were discussed." 7
Opinion by: Justice Lavender; Chief Justice Dooling, Vice
Chief Justice Hargrave, and Justices Wilson and Summers
concurred.
Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part: Justice
Hodges, with Justice Simms joining, would not only have denied
child rearing damages, but would have denied the tort cause of
action altogether. They would, however, have approved of a con-
tract cause of action.858
Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part: Justice Opala,
with Justice Kauger joining, would have allowed child rearing
damages. They would also have allowed damages for the costs of
the failed procedure and the costs of a repeated procedure, pain
and suffering, emotional distress, loss of consortium, lost wages,
and hospital and medical expenses related to the pregnancy.35 9
355. Morris v. Sanchez, No. 63,675 (surviving number), No. 63,768 (Consolidated),
slip op. (Okla. Sup. Ct, Nov. 10, 1987) (LEXIS, States library, Omni file).
356. Id.
357. Id.
358. Id. (Hodges, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
359. Id. (Opala, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Oregon
No cases were found.
Pennsylvania
Leading Case: Mason v. Western Pennsylvania Hospital.360
Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania (highest court).
Basic Facts: The plaintiff underwent an unsuccessful tubal li-
gation performed by the defendant physician. The plaintiff sub-
sequently gave birth to a normal baby and sued the defendant
physician and hospital for negligence. 6
Holding on Damages: Damages were allowed, but were lim-
ited to all medical expenses and lost wages related to the preg-
nancy, and pain and suffering. 62 Child rearing damages were
disallowed due to public policy.363 Emotional distress damages
connected to child rearing were also disallowed. 6'
Opinion by: Justice Roberts; Justice Hutchinson concurred.
Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part: Chief Justice
O'Brien, with Justice Flaherty joining, would have allowed child
rearing damages offset by the value of the benefits of
parenthood." Emotional distress damages should also be
recoverable.3 6
360. 499 Pa. 484, 453 A.2d 974 (1982).
361. Id. at 486, 453 A.2d at 975.
362. Id. at 486, 453 A.2d at 976.
363. Id. at 487, 453 A.2d at 976. "[T]he financial and emotional costs of raising a
healthy child are not compensable .... [T]he benefits of joy, companionship, and affec-
tion which a normal, healthy child can provide must be deemed as a matter of law to
outweigh the costs of raising that child." Id.
364. Id.
365. Id. at 488, 453 A.2d at 977 (O'Brien, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part):
I see no justifiable reason to differentiate between the present case and our deci-
sion in Speck v. Finegold, allowing the plaintiffs to seek damages for the cost of
raising their genetically defective child. Any other result is inconsistent. It is not
the relative health of the child, but is instead the alleged negligence of the physi-
cian, that gives rise to all damages that are foreseeable. "The law of liability
should not turn on . . . fortuitous considerations."
Id. (quoting Howard v. Lecher, 42 N.Y.2d 109, 113, 366 N.E.2d 64, 66, 397 N.Y.S.2d 363,
365 (1977)) (citations omitted).
366. Id. at 492-93, 453 A.2d at 979:
It is well established in Pennsylvania that an injured party may recover not
only for actual physical injury sustained, but also for the concomitant mental and
emotional suffering. Knaub v. Gotwalt, 422 Pa. 267, 220 A.2d 646 (1966); Cucinotti
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Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part: Justice Nix,
with Justice McDermott joining, would have allowed a cause of
action in this case for breach of contract warranties, but would
not have allowed damages for emotional distress; 67 they also
would not have allowed any action in negligence for the birth of
an unwanted child. 08
Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part: Justice Larsen
would have permitted the parents of such children to recover
the full cost of raising their unplanned child to the age of
majority. 69
Rhode Island
No cases were found.
South Carolina
No cases were found.
Tennessee
Leading Case: Smith v. Gore.7 0
v. Ortmann, 399 Pa. 26, 159 A.2d 216 (1960); Ewing v. Pgh. C. & St. L. Ry. Co.,
147 Pa. 40, 23 A. 340 (1892). Indeed, an individual may recover for the emotional
and mental distress resulting from another's negligence where there has been no
physical impact. Niederman v. Brodsky, 436 Pa. 401, 261 A.2d 84 (1970).
Id. at 493, 453 A.2d at 979.
367. Id. at 493-95, 453 A.2d at 979-80. (Nix & McDermott, JJ., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
368. Id. at 494, 453 A.2d at 980:
I reemphasize that I acknowledge the limited right of privacy recognized in Roe v.
Wade, but I do not accept the ipse dixit position of the existence of a right to
control reproductivity which requires the state to provide civil recourse when a
private party fails to intercept the natural process of birth.
Id. (citations omitted).
369. Id. at 496 n.1, 453 A.2d at 981 n.1. (Larsen, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part):
[Diefendants should be able to deduct the emotional benefits of childrearing from
the emotional trauma of raising a child. However, I do not agree that the "benefit
rule" should be applied so as to allow the deduction of benefits received from the
child twice - once from the damages for childrearing trauma, and again from the
actual costs of childrearing - because this would provide a windfall to the
tortfeasor.
Id.
370. 728 S.W.2d 738 (Tenn. 1987).
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Court: Supreme Court of Tennessee (highest court).
Basic Facts: The plaintiff alleged that she underwent a tubal
ligation and, because of the defendant's negligence, she gave
birth to a normal baby boy. The plaintiff sued the defendant
doctors, hospital, and manufacturer of the sterilization tech-
nique for negligence.37 1
Holding on Damages: Recoverable damages were limited to
medical expenses, pain and suffering, lost wages, loss of consor-
tium, and emotional distress. Child rearing damages were specif-
ically excluded.3 7 1
Opinion by: Justice Droweta.
Texas
Leading Case: Hickman v. Myers. 3
Court: Court of Appeals of Texas, Fort Worth (intermediate
appellate court).
Basic Facts: The plaintiff couple sued the defendant physician
for negligence after an unsuccessful tubal ligation resulted in the
plaintiff wife becoming pregnant and giving birth to a normal
healthy baby.37 '
Holding on Damages: The court was not specific as to which,
if any, damages it would uphold in a wrongful pregnancy action.
The court specifically denied child rearing damages, 7 5 however,
in any case where the unplanned child is healthy. 7
Opinion by: Justice Spurlock.
371. Id. at 740.
372. Id. at 751.
373. 632 S.W.2d 869 (Tex. 1982).
374. Id.
375. Id. at 871-72.
It is in society's best interest to hold physicians to a standard of professional com-
petence and impose liability when they are negligent in treating their patients, but
to hold a doctor responsible for the support of a mistakenly conceived child takes
him well beyond the scope of his duty to his patient ..
Id.
376. Id. at 870. "[Tlhere can only be an enforceable claim under Texas law if the
child is found not to be healthy." Id.
19881
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Utah
No cases were found.
Vermont
No cases were found.
Virginia
Leading Case: Miller v. Johnson.8"
Court: Supreme Court of Virginia (highest court).
Basic Facts: Two similar cases were consolidated on appeal. In
both cases, the mothers sued their physicians for wrongful preg-
nancy after their abortions failed and they gave birth to healthy
children.173
Holding on Damages: Damages are recoverable for "medical
expenses, pain and suffering, and lost wages for a reasonable pe-
riod, directly resulting from the negligently performed abortion,
the continuing pregnancy, and the ensuing childbirth."3 9 Dam-
ages for emotional distress may be recovered if related to the
tortious physical injury.38 0 Child rearing damages are not recov-
erable because they are too speculative.3 81
Opinion by: Justice Cochran.
Dissenting Opinion: Justice Russell would have denied all
damages to the plaintiffs on the basis that they had proved no
compensable injury."' 2
377. 231 Va. 177, 343 S.E.2d 301 (1986).
378. Id. at 179-80, 343 S.E.2d at 302-03.
379. Id. at 183-84, 343 S.E.2d at 305.
380. Id. at 184, 343 S.E.2d at 305.
381. Id. at 186, 343 S.E.2d at 307: "We do not.., base our ruling on public policy
[which is] . . .best left to the General Assembly .... [A] court or jury is not capable of
determining with any reasonable certainty the costs of bringing a child to maturity less
the offsetting value of the child's life." Id. at 186-87, 343 S.E.2d at 307.
382. Id. at 188-89, 343 S.E.2d at 308. (Russell, J., dissenting):
The majority opinion rejects . . .damages for ... rearing ....
Yet, the majority, illogically it seems to me, permits recovery for medical ex-
penses, pain, suffering, lost wages, and emotional distress arising from the defend-
ant physicians' failure to prevent the birth of healthy, normal children. :..
• .. [Plain, suffering, and mental anguish, which the majority permits, are
more subjective and less susceptible of precise calculation than the actual ex-
penses of rearing children.
[Vol. 8:313
56http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol8/iss2/4
WRONGFUL PREGNANCY
Washington
Leading Case: McKernan v. Aasheim. s5 3
Court: Supreme Court of Washington, en banc (highest court).
Basic Facts: The plaintiff parents sued the defendant physi-
cian for the negligent performance of a tubal ligation when the
procedure was unsuccessful and resulted in the birth of a nor-
mal, healthy child.3 8 4
Holding on Damages: Damages were recoverable for the ex-
pense, pain and suffering, and loss of consortium associated with
the failed tubal ligation, pregnancy, and childbirth.15  Child
rearing damages were disallowed, as too speculative and con-
trary to public policy.38 6
Opinion by: Justice Dimmick; Chief Justice Williams, and Jus-
tices Rosellini, Utter, Brachtenbach, Dolliver, and Pearson, and
Justice Pro. Tem. Cunningham concurred.
West Virginia
Leading Case: James G. v. Caserta.3 87
Court: Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia (highest
court).
Basic Facts: The parents sought to recover damages resulting
383. 102 Wash. 2d 411, 687 P.2d 850 (1984).
384. Id. at 412-13, 687 P.2d at 851.
385. Id. at 421-22, 687 P.2d at 856.
386. Id. at 419, 687 P.2d at 854. Plaintiff's argument that child rearing damages
should be granted without any offset for the benefits of parenthood "goes too far," said
the court. On the other hand, calculating such benefits would be "impossible":
Perhaps the costs of rearing and educating the child could be determined through
use of actuarial tables or other similar economic information. But whether these
costs are outweighed by the emotional benefits which will be conferred by that
child cannot be calculated .... The child may grow up to be President of the
United States, or to be an infamous criminal. In short, it is impossible to tell, at
an early stage in the child's life, whether its parents have sustained a net loss or
net gain ....
We base our holding.., on yet another ground. Under the "benefits" rule,
parents would be obliged to prove their child was more trouble than it was worth.
We therefore hold that to permit recovery of the child-rearing costs would violate
the public policy of this state.
Id. at 419-21, 687 P.2d at 855-56.
387. 332 S.E.2d 872 (W.Va. 1985). Two cases were consolidated on appeal, only one
of which is applicable here.
1988]
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from a negligently performed tubal ligation. The plaintiff wife
later became pregnant, and delivered a normal, healthy child.3 18
Holding on Damages: Damages were allowed, including any
medical and hospital expenses incurred, pain and suffering
(mental and physical), loss of wages, and loss of consortium.389
Child rearing damages were not allowed because they were too
remote and speculative."' 0
Opinion by: Chief Justice Miller.
Wisconsin
No cases were found.$9"
Wyoming
Leading Case: Beardsley v. Wierdsma3 92
Court: Supreme Court of Wyoming (highest court).
Basic Facts: The facts of this consolidated appeal were well
summarized by the court as follows:
Eighteen appellants had tubal ligations so that they would
become sterile, but instead became pregnant. They were plaintiffs
below. At the time of the suits eleven of these had given birth to
healthy, normal children; three of the appellants were pregnant;
and four of the appellants had terminated their pregnancies. '
The plaintiffs sued the physician, the hospital, and the manufac-
turer of the cauterization instrument used in the procedure, on
388. Id. at 874.
389. Id. at 877.
390. Id. at 878 (citing Jordan v. Bero, 158 W.Va. 28, 210 S.E.2d 618 (1974)). See also
id. at 882-83. In the consolidated case, which involved the failure of the physician to
perform an amnioscentesis and the subsequent birth of a child with Down's syndrome,
the court held that "parents may in a wrongful birth action recover the extraordinary
costs for rearing a child with birth defects not only during his minority, but also after the
child reaches the age of majority if the child is unable to support himself because of
physical or emotional disabilities." Id.
391. But see Rieck v. Medical Protective Co. of Fort Wayne, Ind., 64 Wis. 2d 514,
219 N.W.2d 242 (1974), where the parents sued a physician who failed to diagnose the
plaintiff wife's pregnancy in a timely fashion, thus preventing the plaintiff from opting
for an abortion. Damages were denied. The case is too factually dissimilar for inclusion
in the body of this Comment.
392. 650 P.2d 288 (Wyo. 1982).
393. Id. at 289.
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grounds of negligence.""'
Holding on Damages: Damages were allowed for the medical
expenses for the unsuccessful procedure, medical and hospital
expenses for the birth of the unplanned child, wages lost, pain
and suffering in connection with the pregnancy, and the costs
and pain and suffering in connection with abortions.39 5 Child
rearing damages were denied for several reasons. 396
Opinion by: Justice Brown.
Concurring Specially: Chief Justice Rose believed that the
court should allow child rearing damages to be recoverable sub-
ject to an offset for the parental benefits received from the
child. 97
394. Id.
395. Id. at 292.
396. Id.
We believe that these . . . expenses and damages are too speculative; that the
injury is too remote from the negligence; that the injury is out of proportion to the
culpability of the tortfeasors; and that the allowance of recovery would place too
unreasonable a burden on appellees, since it would likely open the way for fraudu-
lent claims, and since it would enter a field that has no sensible or just stopping
point.
We specifically reject the "benefit-rule" or offset concept....
. . . [T]he benefits of the birth of a healthy, normal child outweigh the ex-
pense of rearing a child....
... [W]e can conceive of the ridiculous result that benefits could be greater
than damages, in which event someone could argue that the parents would owe
something to the tortfeasors. We think that a child should not be viewed as a
piece of property, with fact finders first assessing the expense and damage in-
curred because of a child's life, then deducting the value of that child's life.
Id. at 292-93.
397. Id. at 293-97 (Rose, C.J., concurring specially). Chief Justice Rose believed that
the plaintiffs should be allowed to prove and recover any items of damage which are the
proximate result of a defendant's negligence, regardless of "moralistic and social over-
tones." Wyoming has no public policy which would prevent such damages and, indeed,
has provided for state assistance with regard to family planning, indicating an opposite
policy. Damages are no more speculative in these cases than in cases for wrongful death,
pain and suffering, and loss of enjoyment of life. He also believed that the "benefit rule"
is very appropriate to this class of case:
[T]hrough application of the "benefit rule" the courts give recognition to the phi-
losophy that the costs and benefits associated with the introduction of an unplan-
ned child to the family will vary depending upon the circumstances of the parents.
As was stated in Troppi v. Scarf, ... "Family size, family income, age of the
parents, and marital status are some, but not all, the factors which the trier must
consider in determining the extent to which the birth of a particular child repre-
sents a benefit to his parents .... By recognizing these considerations, the "bene-
fit rule" encourages and entrusts the trier of fact with the responsibility of weigh-
1988]
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Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part: Justice
Rooney would have ruled that since the benefits of parenthood
are "incalculable because of their magnitude," no damages
would be sufficient to offset them. He would, therefore, have de-
nied the existence of the claim.39
ing and considering all of the factors associated with the birth of the unplanned
child in a given "wrongful pregnancy" case.
Id. at 296-97 (citation omitted). Finally, Chief Justice Rose would also have allowed
damages for loss of enjoyment of life and loss of consortium, two additional elements of
damage normally allowed in Wyoming, but omitted by the majority opinion. Id. at 297.
398. Id. (Rooney, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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